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ABSTRACT
Traditionally benefit cost analysis relies on a monetized
metric. Not all variables convert to this metric in a
meaningful way. No single criterion appears sufficient to
permit proper analysis, nor is it reasonable to assume that
the decision makers perceive the decision in terms of a
single criterion. This thesis reviews and develops several
of the techniques available for the evaluation and, where
appropriate, ranking of the many possible objectives of
rural investments.
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
A large portion of the rural development budget is allo-
cated to transportation, which is seen as a necessary,
although not always sufficient, precondition to successful
development. Traditionally, governments and international
funding agencies (decision makers) select and rank
transportation investments using economic efficiency
criteria: benefit-cost ratios, net present worth, economic
and internal rate of return. Each methodology depends upon
vehicle operation cost savings to produce the bulk benefits.
By definition, rural penetration roads have little or no
traffic nor can traffic on other routes divert to them. A
problem therefore exists: without current users, no tradi-
tional analysis can be performed.
To aid the decision maker, the analysts need a more
relevant, flexible system to help identify, evaluate, and
rank viable rural transportation investments.
The traditional benefit cost analysis referred to above
relies on a monetary measure. Not all variables readily
convert to this measure (e.g., access, health, education,
political integration). No single criterion appears suffi-
cient to permit proper analysis, nor is it reasonable to
assume that the decision makers perceive the decision in
terms of a single criterion.
In 1979 the Transport Research Review Panel(l) of the
IBRD made the following observation on the subject of rural
roads evaluation research:
"Although great attention is paid to qualitative
factors, an important part of the research is
devoted to the computation of money-expressed
effects mainly related to the extension of the
monetary exchange economy. However, an unusual
amount of work has been devoted to analyze (and
translate into money equivalents) the implications
of the subsistence economy. Still more emphasis
might be put on methods permitting the evaluation
of qualitative effects by means of a ranking or
ordinal approach."
This observation indicated that techniques were still
needed to redress the problem voiced by the XV Congress of
the PIARC(2) held in Mexico City in 1975:
"The use of Cost Benefit investigations to measure
the value of new road projects has resulted in an
exaggeration of the importance of the primary road
system...[There] is a danger that financial
resources may be diverted from the projects of
rural systems which are directly linked to the
promotion of social and economic development...."
To properly address these concerns, evaluation must
take into account national and regional impacts, not just of
the traditional quantifiable economic effects, but of the
"qualitative" effects as well: access, health, education,
employment, and political integration.
The road investments discussed in this thesis serve
little or no existing traffic, and during the analysis
horizon may not exceed 50 to 100 AADT. User savings are not
a source of benefits. The main monetary benefits will be
agricultural or producer surplus generated in the zone of
influence of the new road. Other benefits will come from the
areas grouped under the heading "qualitative" as defined
above.
The purpose of this thesis is to review and develop
several of the techniques available for the evaluation and,
when appropriate, the ranking of the many possible
objectives of rural investments.
In order to achieve this purpose, the thesis presents a
discussion of potential objectives (Chapter Two); reviews a
series of techniques for evaluating them (Chapter Three);
evaluates and ranks a hypothetical series of projects where
consensus exists among decision makers as to inter-criteria
weight (Chapter Four); and evaluates a case where no
consensus exists (Chapter Five). Chapter Six summarizes the
thesis and posits some issues for further research. The
supporting appendices follow thereafter.
Chapter Two
OBJECTIVES USED IN EVALUATION OF RURAL ROAD INVESTMENTS
Rarely will the road investment be a sufficient
condition for the zone of influence to shift from a
traditional or subsistance economy status to a net producer
of surplus cash crops for the economy. Additional
investments will normally be needed to stimulate the
population. These investments can be in the form of extra
transport vehicles, medical services, educational
facilities, and agricultural extension services, to name a
few. To the extent that these investments are an
identifiable incremental public spending as part of an
integrated development program they will be included in the
ecomonic cost of the project; however, the perspective of a
road investment will still be maintained.
The objectives listed in Table 1 and discussed below are
not exhaustive. They are drawn from the literature and the
author's experience in the field. National, regional, or
local realities may often dictate that others be added by
the host country decision makers. Special policy and lending
guidelines may dictate other criteria to the lending
agencies. To the extent that their actual objective
functions concur or conflict will determine which of the
later discussions apply.
Table 1
LIST OF POSSIBLE OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS AND UNITS OF MEASURE
Net National Income
Agricultural Surplus
Investment
Net Regional Income
Foreign Exchange
Benefit Distribution
Employment
Access (health, education,
services, etc.) National
Integration and National
Defense
Environmental Impact
Monetary
Monetary, food
value equivalents
Monetary, units of
investment
Monetary
Monetary (usually
hard currency)
Variable
Man years
Variable
Variable
Each of the objectives presented in this chapter will be
summarized, the rationale explained, and possible metrics or
measures discussed. Only economic impacts are addressed
explicitly. The financial cost of the project, especially
under budget constraints, can be relevant; however, it is
not treated herein.
2.1 Net National Income Objective
The net national income objective is the traditional
economic efficiency objective function described earlier. It
is present here for completeness. To the extent that vehicle
operating costs or road maintenance costs are impacted, the
effect will be accumulated in this category. The metric used
is the currency of the country or the normative evaluation
currency of the lending agency.
2.2 Agricultural Surplus Objective
The agricultural surplus objective tends to be the
single most important objective in any evaluation. Also
called producer surplus, it is the net increase in market-
able crop production exported from the zone of influence.
Extensive research has been conducted to better calculate
this function. Theoretical studies, linear programmimg
models, and empirical research by the IBRD and others
continue in an effort to improve the predictive systems
supporting this objective. The details are outside the scope
of this thesis.
The incremental crop production, net of inputs, spoil-
age, seed reserves, and increased local consumption that can
be sold to a market with a deficit is the agricultural sur-
plus. The issue is complicated by the introduction of
extension services bringing new seed and crops to farmers
who wish to shift to a cash crop of higher value. Over time,
farmers grow a smaller amount of food for consumption,
buying the balance of their needs in the market. By this
process farmers transfer from the traditional to the cash
economy.
The preferred measure for this objective function is
usually value added expressed in monetary terms. A secondary
choice is food value units, e.g., equivalent tons of wheat,
but this lacks the credibility that tonnage times market
price less cost of inputs has. It is still possible, how-
ever, to define this objective in tonnage terms if one
policy issue is to reach a production goal in a specific
crop. The same tonnage might be monetized later under a
different objective. A set of work sheets for the value
added metric appear in Appendix C.
2.3 Investment Objective
In traditional analysis, the economic cost of the
project is compared with the economic benefit (net national
income objective) using a series of economic efficiency
tests. In this thesis we treat direct public investment as a
separate function, i.e., investment has an independent and
positive aspect. One objective could be to maintain certain
levels of investment in a country or to balance investments
across political or development regions. In some cases,
lending agencies might need to screen out projects whose
cost is below a certain floor value. A government might
screen out projects whose investments exceed a certain cost
per kilometer or per person. The metric is monetary in this
case also.
2.4 Net Regional Income Objective
National development plans often contain a goal for
balanced regional development. The metric for regional
income is the same as for national income but the rules of
accounting differ, primarily in the treatment of transfer
payments.
From the viewpoint of net income to the nation, trans-
fers are nonproductive economically and only serve objec-
tives such as income redistribution (another potential
objective). Taxing the income of a person in Region A to
provide a health care unit in Region B is the same as using
the tax to provide a health care unit in Region C or, for
that matter, Region A. From the view point of Region A,
however, the tax is a cost. If the health care unit were in
Region B or C, it would be a pure benefit to that region,
the same as any other costless investment. If the unit went
to Region A, then the benefits would have to be netted
against the costs.
A second example is the case of the recipient of a
nationally funded welfare program. The welfare receipts
represent income to the region in which he resides. Should
this person become ineligible for welfare, the loss is a
cost to the region. If the ineligibility resulted from his
taking a job, then the effect on the net regional income
will be the difference between the wage received and the
foregone welfare payment (preferably a positive number).
Another example relates to the net agricultural surplus
anticipated. The difference between the production plus
delivery cost and the market price represents potential
income nationally. To the region, the question is the
distribution. Certainly the difference between the produc-
tion cost and the farmgate price is a net increment to the
regional income. Only to the extent that the transporter is
a part of the regional economy (that is, he resides,
consumes, and invests in the region) will the difference
between transport price and cost be a regional income
increment. Finally, the difference between wholesale cost
and retail price represents income to the region only to the
extent that middlemen and market women are part of the
regional economy.
2.5 Foreign Exchange Objective
A major concern of government officials in most LDC's is
the preservation of foreign exchange. It therefore follows
that an important decision variable is the use of foreign
exchange for any investment plan. High technology solutions
are often positively correlated with increased foreign
exchange components, regardless of whether the total eco-
nomic cost is different. One example is the philosophy of
zero maintenance pavements where the supply of maintenance
is, at best, unreliable. Although the total transportation
cost (construction plus maintenance plus vehicle operation
cost) will possibly be lower, the drain on foreign exchange
reserves for the increased asphalt requirement may be unac-
ceptable.
The foreign exchange objective function must be formu-
lated in terms of the opportunity cost of the foreign
exchange consumed. There are two classes: general reserves
and "dedicated funds". Exchange in the general reserve
yields an economic return to the country as a function of
where it is invested. Obviously, the economic benefits from
such consumer luxury goods as champagne and fancy cars is at
the low end of the range, while necessary construction equip-
ment and machine tools are at the high end. When health,
education, and military material are competing against the
rural transport sector for scarce dollars, these dollars
should be weighted properly.
"Dedicated funds" are normally foreign exchange which
"must" be spent on specific infrastructure investment.
Exchange in this catagory would be lending agency sector
loans or grants and legislatively established reserves from
taxes or offshore revenues. These dollars cannot be spent on
other sectors, but must still be competed for within the
sector so long as there exists a scarcity of funds.
The metric for foreign exchange can be either the cur-
rency of the country or some other measure of "hard" cur-
rency (for example, dollars, francs, SDRs). If the chosen
metric is the national currency, the assumption is that the
analyst has the knowledge or the authority to set the shadow
price of foreign exchange for each use.
2.6 Benefit Distribution Objective
Neither agricultural surplus nor net regional income
would be an adequate objective for lending agencies needing
to know to whom the benefits would accrue. Explicit account-
ing of the distribution of economic benefits among project
beneficiaries has long been recognized as an important
aspect of the appraisal of feeder road projects. Alleviation
of poverty among the poorest of the rural population has
repeatedly been cited as a primary goal of rural develop-
ment. Another critical element of project design is ensuring
that the reduction in the cost of transport is not shared by
only the middlemen and the transport owners. Regardless of
how much money is saved, if the net farm income does not
increase, there is no incentive to any farmer to increase
production.
Often the distribution of this farmer surplus is further
disaggregated to measure what USAID calls their "equity"
objective. Prediction of the small farmers' share of
increased agricultural production is, in practice, harder to
make. Field surveys are required to determine tillable land
ownership by income group. Use of this measure might entail
certain restrictive assumptions, including, for example: (1)
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economic conditions of perfect competition exist, (2) aver-
age productivity and crop choice of the land is uniform, and
(3) share of economic benefits is proportional to land
ownership. Nevertheless, this appears to be a reasonably
reliable representation of the distribution of benefits to
the target population. The use of this measure is
illustrated by comparing the following two extreme cases.
In the first case, the project area of influence con-
sists of a community of 500 persons, all of whom are pres-
ently existing on income levels below that of the target
income level. Some 750 additional hectares of cultivatable
land are to be opened up and planted, with the ownership to
be distributed evenly among the population, resulting in a
homogeneous distribution of the new output of agriculture.
In the second case, the project area of influence consists
of a community of 300 persons, of whom some 270 are peasants
either farming at a traditional level of existence or work-
ing for the five relatively rich families of the community.
Although induced agriculture production is expected to be
large, because land tenure is not secure, the peasant group
share is expected to be negligible since the five rich
families will "own" almost all of the available new culti-
vatable land.
Within the context of the Benefit Distribution objective
function, the use of a monetized metric would not provide
the necessary information. A better metric would be one
which reflects the actual policy definition:
- how many hectares of arable land will be added to
small farmer holdings?
- how many peasant farmers will reach the target
income level?
- how many new farms of 0.75 to 2.0 hectares
will result?
The latter could be particularly relevant if the results
of empirical research show that small farm holdings must
exceed 0.75 hectares before a shift to cash cropping will
occur.
2.7 Employment Objective
Consideration of employment in project appraisal raises
the question of whether employment should be treated as an
end, or as a means to meeting other policy goals. Kes-
sing(3) argues that employment must be treated as a sepa-
rate objective as generation of employment does not emerge
naturally from the process of pursuing traditional macro-
economic objectives, while UNIDO(4) argues that it is a
means associated with the redistribution objective. Addi-
tional arguments which consider employment as a separate mea-
sure include its service as an indicator of the mobility of
labor, an important factor.of production that needs to be
mobilized for productive purposes in many rural areas; as a
measure of relative labor intensity among projects; as a
measure of technology transfer (unskilled to semiskilled
workers on construction or maintenance); as a measure of
migration trend with respect to a new pattern of agricul-
tural practice; and as a measure of local labor substituting
for foreign capital.
Man-years of employment associated with or as a conse-
quence of projected investment throughout the life of the
project are suggested as a measure of employment. Included
is employment generated as a direct result of construction
and maintenance activities as well as that expected in con-
junction with increased economic (primarily agricultural)
activity.
Employment of extension workers and other government
employees would not be included at the national level of
employment analysis; if they would otherwise be employed
elsewhere it could be relevant to a regional analysis.
Although employment occurs over time, as do economic bene-
fits and costs, its value, if expressed in a non-monetary
metric, is assumed constant and no discounting is required.
Possible refinement in this measure would incorporate a
distinction between short- and long-term employment, checks
on the expected availability of labor over time relative to
its expected use, and unskilled versus skilled man-years
generated.
Employment should not be monetized via wages, especially
if the regional income objective is being used. It can,
however, be normalized for zone population to aid compari-
son. Agricultural labor should be counted carefully to avoid
overstating this objective where detrimental diversion
occurs.
2.8 Access Objective
One of the most significant problems facing analysts has
always been quantification of the benefits to the impacted
population derived from improved access to social services
such as schools, health care units (clinics, hospitals,
etc.), dependable, clean water and electricity, and other
government facilities. The basic cause of this problem
results from demands of single-objective analysis, which
require that a life saved or six extra years of education be
monetized. This problem prompted analysts to place such
objectives in the category of "unquantifiable" or
"intangible."
The decision makers never establish as an investment
goal one million dollars of life savings or one million
dollars of education benefits. The goals are more frequently
presented(5) as:
Health Care
- One rural hospital bed per 1,000 population
- One rural health center per 50,000 people
- One dispensary per 10,000 people with a 10
kilometer access limit
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Education
- 100 percent primary school enrollment by 1977 with
a school in each settlement or village
If the goal is access to a social service within x miles
for everyone in the zone of impact, or access to one facil-
ity for each y thousand people, then this will define the
metric for this objective. For the former, the scale would
be the percent of population in the zone of influence having
access to the social service unit; for the latter, the goal
population, y, is divided into the population actually
served. The definition of the population actually served,
whether everyone in the zone or only those with real access,
will depend on how the objective function is defined.
Figures 1 and 2 present such information for Nigeria.(6)
If several services are evaluated, a unified objective
function could be designed, or each service kept as a
separate function. Other services could include: rural
electrification, visiting mobile clinic, post office, bank,
piped water, telephone connection to the national network,
and agricultural extension workers and pilot farm projects.
2.9 Environmental Impact Objective
This objective is mentioned because of the emphasis by
some international lending agencies, primarily the U.S.
Agency for International Development, although there is
Figure 1
Health Care Facilities Per Million Population, Nigeria
Number of Maternity Centres Per One Million
Women of Child Bearing Age
Number of Midwives Per One Million Women
of Child Bearing Age
Number of Dispensaries Per One Million People
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Average Access to Education Facilities in Nigeria
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little indication from aid recipients that this is a major
concern to them.
Measuring environmental impacts, in the multiobjective
sense, must necessarily be impact specific. If the impact is
arable land loss due to road investment caused erosion, the
metric could be arable hectarage. If, on the other hand,
restorative steps were contemplated, the metric could be
monetized, e.g., the cost of avoiding loss of hectarage.
Similarly, for bacteriological health hazards in bodies of
water, parts per million or restorative cost would be appro-
priate.
2.10 Objective Utility Functions
Having chosen a set of objectives for the analysis and
collected each data base in a relevant metric, the analyst
must then seek the assistance of the decision makers to
define each utility function. Various utility assessment
techniques are available.
In the category technique a number of discrete cate-
gories are specified for a particular objective, and the
decision maker is asked to assign each project to one of
these categories on the basis of its contribution to the
objective. Once this has been done for all projects, numeri-
cal worths can be determined for each category, the resul-
tant value being rather approximate.
A second technique, the gamble, consists of lotteries
constructed by varying the level of the measure or the
probabilities of occurrence until the decision maker is
indifferent between the lottery and a certainty equivalent.
This tends to be a somewhat complicated and confusing tech-
nique requiring quite a bit of time spent on the part of the
analyst in educating the decision maker.
A third common approach, the direct technique, requires
the decision maker to directly assign numerical values to
the various levels of attainment of a particular measure.
This technique can be accomplished in one of two ways:
(1) anchor one extreme point of the measure and compare all
other values of the measure with this anchor in assigning
numerical values reflecting the utility; or (2) anchor the
two extreme values of the measure along a scale of 0 to 100,
specify a few convenient intermediate points such as the
mid-, quarter-, and three-quarter points, and use linear
interpolation to complete the preference function.
The direct technique is generally the most attractive
and is used in the hypothetical testing of the appraisal
framework in Chapter Four. A sample of its use in construct-
ing the preference function for the benefit distribution
objective is given in Figure 3. In actual practice, the
final selection of the utility assessment technique depends
very much on the preferences of the decision maker and the
particular topic of the assessment.
Figure 3
Distribution Preference (Utility) Function
200 600 800 1000
Hectares
The measure of distribution arising from all projects under consideration ranges from
20 hectares to 1000 hectares. 600 hectares has been anticipated as the "50" point, 400 as
the "25" point, and 720 as the "75" point. The distribution preference function is therefore:
0.0658 x 3 - 1.316
0.125 x - 25
0.28 x 3  - 75
0.0893 x3 + 10.7
20 < x3 < 400
400 < x3 <_600
600 <_ x3 < 720
720 < x3 <1000
- 3-
Source: Chew (17)
u(x3)
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Additional techniques can be developed should one of
these three not seem appropriate. In some cases, the abso-
lute value of the measure is sufficient and no utility
function is needed. This occurs when a policy sets minimum
values or cut-off points. An example of this would be a
condition that no road would be considered where the
investment per kilometer per capita exceeded $200.
Chapter Three
TECHNIQUES FOR MULTI-OBJECTIVE EVALUATION
This chapter presents a series of methodologies for
performing multi-objective analysis and evaluation. After a
brief description of the current status of single objective
analysis and its shortcomings as applied to development
economics in the context of rural road investments, the
chapter discusses the need for multi-objective analysis, the
parameters of the analytical field, and a technique
appropriate to each level of consensus/disparity within the
decision making community.
3.1 Introduction
Single objective analysis is the system currently in
widest use by planners and lending agencies for project
appraisal. In 1970, Israel(7) summarized the state of the
art as follows:
"The methodologies used in feeder road appraisals
fall into two groups: the social surplus methods,
used in the quantification of road user savings,
and the national income methods. In dealing with
feeder roads, the practical possibilities of the
national income approach are better than those of
the social surplus approach. The operational
difficulties of properly applying the latter when
major changes in income, income distribution,
techniques, relative prices, and tastes are
expected, are far greater than the theoretical
limitations of the national income approach."
Clearly, the definition of a penetration road precludes
any appraisal methodology relying on road user savings;
however, a social surplus approach is not necessarily
precluded. In a later Bank paper, Carnemark(8) argues the
merits of a producer surplus methodology for estimating
agricultural and forestry benefits "where existing levels of
economic activity and traffic are insufficient for economic
justification of the project."
Increased economic activity in the form of the export of
surpluses from the region will show net financial benefits
to everyone involved, from farmers to the middlemen and
transporters to the markets. If not, they would not grow,
buy, or transport it. This financial benefit may also repre-
sent a net economic benefit, thereby defending the invest-
ment in the road. However, the distribution of the net bene-
fits accruing to the producers is the relevant issue in
forecasting the production response, that is, the volume of
surplus that will be grown.
If the farmer is assumed to be responsive to changes in
his net income, the change in farmgate prices is required to
predict the response. However, farmgate price change is only
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used to predict producer activity, and Carnemark(8) still
uses the net national income approach for overall evalua-
tion.
In fact, other than recognizing that the distribution of
the benefits may have an influence on the level of response,
there has been little progress in the application of multi-
objective appraisal techniques for penetration roads over
that defined in 1965 by Brown and Harral.(9)
3.2 Multi-Objective Analysis
Single objective techniques traditionally used in the
analysis of road projects, like savings in user costs,
producer and consumer surplus, and change in national
income, are inadequate for a disaggregated analysis of the
spectrum of objectives relevant to the rural development
effort. Multi-objective analysis can incorporate both
economic and non-economic objectives into the evaluation
framework.
The techniques or methodologies available for multi-
objective analysis reflect the degree of stability and
consensus in the decision making environment. Where rela-
tionships and decision maker variables are well articulated
and constant, the analysts can produce an optimal solution.
As stability and consensus decline, the technician's
solutions drop from optimal to "best" to pareto-optimal, to
what can only be termed a negotiated solution. The earlier
in the analytical process the evaluation is truncated, the
less aggregated the data to be presented the decision
makers. This process is shown in Figure 4. The technique
for presentation of the analysts "final" report must be
appropriately chosen so as not to appear to be making
decisions which were not delegated.
disaggregated
fully partially aggregated no defined disaggregated
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3.2.1 Ranking
At the apex of the analysis, each attribute is valued in
terms of some common attribute, usually, monetary. Thus, the
many dimensions or attributes characterizing a given project
may be collapsed into one dimension, and the value of the
project is proportional to the total amount of the
attribute. The project with the highest score is optimal.
The techniques corresponding to this level of analysis
are those that are traditional to benefit-cost analysis
methodologies; the unifying characteristic is the single
numeraire, resulting in their being referred to as the
aggregate method of multi-objective analysis. The UNIDO
Guidelines(4), for example, use consumption measured in
Figure 4
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domestic prices, while Little and Mirrlees(10) use a public
income numeraire measured in world prices. Through the use
of social pricing, more than a single objective can be
implicitly considered: for example, the growth objective in
the case of UNIDO(4) and the equity objective in that of
Squire and van der Tak(ll). Non-economic objectives may also
be considered through the use of an appropriate metric,
which is typically difficult to determine and next to impos-
sible for planners and decision makers to agree on in prac-
tice.
3.2.2 Evaluation by Project
Often, the full set of attributes is not expressible in
terms of a single numeraire, but sufficient consensus exists
among decision makers that a utility function can be defined
which expresses the level of satisfaction with each alter-
native project design. The project with the highest utility
level is thus optimal.
At this stage of the analysis, the element of subjec-
tivity still exists, but the value judgments are articulated
explicitly by the appropriate elected or appointed official,
as opposed to the implicit value judgments implied by the
metric conversions that are generally carried out by rather
arbitrary articulators in the course of the planning pro-
cess. Keeney and Raiffa(12), in fact, have developed
specialized techniques for determining the appropriate
mathematical form of the utility function depending on the
type of independent relationships among the attributes.
3.2.3 Processing by Objective
In many situations the analysis cannot reach the project
evaluation stage for one of two reasons: (1) there are
several independent decision makers, each with a distinct
utility function; or (2) an individual decision maker may
have multiple objectives or measures of utility against
which the project design must be compared, but he may be
uncertain as to their relative importance. Therefore, a
single utility function cannot generally be determined. The
original list of alternatives might be narrowed to a set of
efficient or non-inferior designs, with the final review and
selection being made outside of this analytic framework.
The analyst's role, if analysis is to truncate at this
stage, narrows to a search for the pareto-optimal set of
alternatives (that set which is not dominated), and the
final choice is likely to be heavily political. Location of
the set of pareto-optimal alternatives is particularly
relevant when a single alternative has to be selected, such
as is the case in which the alternatives are all variants of
the same project. It is equally relevant in the context of
the feeder roads problem, where many projects are to be
selected from an even larger set of potential projects, and
the government and the lending agency are not optimizing
over the same objectives or each has a distinctly different
inter-objective function.
3.2.4 Data Collection, Verification and Organization
At the lowest level of truncation, an iterative analytic
process between decision maker and analyst is used to arrive
at the best compromise under a situation of multiple objec-
tives or utility functions as follows: (1) the most effi-
cient consequences of selected assumptions concerning the
relative importance of each objective are presented; (2) a
new set of assumptions is derived through inputs from the
parties involved; (3) the associated efficient consequences
are displayed; and (4) further iterations take place until a
final decision is reached. This is essential if the decision
maker is unwilling or unable to articulate the roles and,
upon receiving the analysts' best effort, does not like the
answer.
This iterative processing is often referred to as back-
ing into the solution. The decision maker has received a
directive - "Build the Amakalakala - Petchibun Road to
class B-2 standards" and must now implement the political
decision within the formal analytical structure of the Works
Board or the rules of the lending agency. Often the decision
maker is unable to state this fait accompli to the analyst,
and must therefore shape the decision process by steps to
ensure the "correct" answer is reached. The problem is not
uncommon.
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Turning to the problem at hand, feeder road appraisal
can be visualized as a choice of many small projects where
each project has several important selection criteria, each
measure is expressed in its own units, and the set of proj-
ects to be implemented is selected from a much larger set. A
good example is the Thailand Department of Highway's road
study in 1980(13). The study reviewed 15,000 kilometers of
national and 29,000 kilometers of provincial roads (some
2,100 links) and passed them through four screens, some with
explicit utility functions (e.g., exclude roads upgraded in
the last 3 years, or built in the last five, or scheduled
for improvement in the next 5 year plan, or on a lending
agency project list) and some iterative, in order to iden-
tify 1,500 kilometers of projects for the next five-year
plan. Early in the study, it was observed that too many
rural roads dropped out of the project pool. During an
iterative stage and to control the loss of rural roads from
the project set, 135 links failing the second screen were
dubbed "developmental" roads and held for further testing.
Still, only 12 of these links were suitable for further
analysis. After a second iteration, a study called the Rural
Roads One Program was commissioned into which the 123
remaining links were placed with some additional 3,000
kilometers of non-departmental roads. These roads were then
analyzed under a completely new set of objective functions.
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The situations characterized by this example are very
realistic representations of scenarios in developing coun-
tries where there are numerous parties involved, each with
its own interests and capabilities, and each desiring
participation in the decision process. For the purpose of
this thesis we will examine two situations: one where
consensus exists, permitting the definition of a utility
function, and one where several objective functions are
clear but no consensus exists or was communicated to the
analyst.
3.3 Evaluation Where Consensus Exists
Let us assume that there is a universal commitment to
the achievement of certain accepted goals, making it
unnecessary to model different preferences among different
interest groups; that is, it is assumed that a single set of
social preferences can be articulated with the help of the
appropriate decision maker, who might be, for example, the
Director of the road authority or the Minister of Public
Works. In view of this assumption and of the characteriza-
tion of the rural road situation given above, the rural road
analysis must be truncated at the evaluation by project
level.
For our example, five objectives are selected to be
incorporated in the framework for evaluation of a set of
rural road projects. These include: (1) net national income,
(2) investment, (3) distribution, (4) accessibility to
social services, and (5) employment. Contributions to these
objectives to be considered are those resulting from
provision of the feeder road and its complementary
investments. These represent just one possible set of
objectives and are not intended to be a universal
representation of the accounting of socioeconomic objectives
of rural development activities. It is the ultimate decision
maker in the particular case under study who must be
satisfied that the set of objectives is sufficient. The
appraisal framework, as structured here, is independent of
changes in the objectives considered or in their number.
3.3.1 Equal Preference Alternative
Implicit in the no-preference alternative is the assump-
tion that all objectives are, in terms of maximum likeli-
hood, of equal importance, which can be demonstrated through
the use of entropy arguments. Therefore, this case is
actually a special subset of the complete information,
cardinal weights case. Thus, the projects are ranked by the
value of the average of the utilities over all objectives:
(3-1)
RANKequal (Pj) n i(xi,j)i=l
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where:
xi,j is the score of the jth project on the ith
objective
ui  is the utility function for the ith objective
n is the number of objectives
Pj denotes the jth project
If the objectives are truly equal in importance, or if
none can be determined to be more important than the others,
according to the best of knowledge of or constraints upon
the decision maker, the analysis can proceed directly using
the above formulation without any further inputs from the
decision maker.
3.3.2 Cardinal Preference Alternative
The cardinal weights, or complete-information, approach
allows for differences in the relative importance of the
various objectives and assumes that explicit weights can
indeed be assigned to each. Projects, therefore, are ranked
according to the weighted sum of the utilities over all
objectives:
(3-2)
RANKcardinal(Pj) = wi wiui(xi, j )
where:
wi is the weight placed on the ith objective and the
other parameters are as before.
To complete the analysis using this formulation, articu-
lation of the cardinal weights must be elicited from the
appropriate decision maker. In actual practice, this often
proves to be rather difficult due both to conceptual
problems in explicitly assigning the correct social weights
and to politically sensitive issues.
3.3.3 Ordinal Preference Alternative
In cases where the decision maker cannot or is unwilling
to specify cardinal weights, the ordinal weights approach
might be used in completing the analysis and ultimately
ranking the projects. Application of this alternative
requires the decision maker to designate an ordinal ranking
of the objectives to reflect their relative importance.
Given this relatively small amount of information, the
analysis can be completed using either maximum likelihood or
linear programming approaches. The linear programming
formulation discussed below was initially developed by
Cannon and Kmietowicz(14) for application to decision-
making problems under uncertainty; further details of its
derivation for its application here were performed by
Brademeyer in 1980(15), and for completeness are given in
l- Appendix A. His maximum likelihood formulation is summarized
in Appendix B.
The linear programming formulation states that given an
ordered set of objectives, the set of utility functions of
the various objectives, and a set of projects, an upper and
lower bound on the weighted score of each project based on
that order of objectives can be determined. That is, any
vector of cardinal weights that obeys the stated ordering
will have a weighted score of not more than this upper bound
and not less than this lower bound for each project. From
Appendix A, we can state that given a set of n ordered
objectives, we can establish n sets of cardinal weights, k,
obeying that order such that one set will produce the upper
bound for any given project and one set will produce the
lower bound.
We can formalize these n sets of weights for the n
objectives in matrix form, wi,k, as follows:
(3-3)
k 1 2 3 .... n
wi,k = 1 1 0 0 .... 0
2 1/2 1/2 0 ...... 0
3 1/3 1/3 1/3 ..... 0
n 1/n 1/n /n . . . . 1/n
or, equivalently, as:
(3-4)
Wi,k = 1/k i < k
wi, k = 0 i > k
Therefore, from the linear programming formulation
detailed in Appendix A, we can produce two decision rules
for ranking the projects:
(3-5)
max k ui(xi,j)
RANK (Pj) = Max [ ]I (k = l,....,n)
ordinal k i=l k
in which the ranking is based on the highest score that each
project may attain given the ordering of the objectives; and
(3-6)
min k ui(xi,j)
RANK (Pj) = Min [ - ] (k = 1,....,n)
ordinal k i=l k
in which the ranking is based on the lowest score that each
project may attain given the ordering of the objectives.
For the maximum-likelihood formulation, which is
presented in Appendix B, the determination of the "most-
likely" set of ordered weights has been designated the mode-
ordinal rule. That analysis shows that given an ordering of
the preferences on the objectives the most-likely set of
weights will be given by:
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Wi = 2- i  (i = 1, 2,...., n-1) (3-7)
wn = Wn-l
Thus, the mode-ordinal ru - produces a set of maximum-
likelihood cardinal weights, and the projects can then be
ranked according to this weighted sum of the utilities over
all objectives:
(3-8)
mode n-l 1-n
RANK Pj) = (,1 2-i ui(xij)) + 2 un(xn,j)
ordina ip'=1
3.3.4 Partial Ordinal Preference Alternative
An alternative situation arises if the decision maker is
only able to articulate a partial ordering of the weights;
that is, he specifies his preference among independent
subsets of the objectives, but cannot or is unwilling to
articulate a preference among the objectives within each
subset. This is a combination of the no information and
ordinal information cases, and it is easily handled by the
above ordinal decision rules. However, the sets of weights
for the max-ordinal and min-ordinal rules are altered, as
are the maximum-likelihood weights in the mode-ordinal rule.
To see this, consider a partition of the objectives into
k mutually exclusive subsets, (Sk), each containing nk
objectives and a stated preference order given by the index
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k; that is, (Sk ) is preferable to or as preferable as
Sk+l. Then the weights for the linear programming rules
become:
(3-9)
k
wi,k = 1/ I nkm=l
wi,k = 0
k
i < I nk
m=1
i > " nk
m=l
and the ranking rules in Equations (3-5) and (3-6) become:
(3-10)
I nk
max m=k ui(xi,j)
RANK (Pj) = Max 5
ordinal k i=l k
I nk
m=l
(3-11)
min
RANK (Pj) = Min
ordinal k
( k
m=l ui(xi,j)
i=l k
I nk
m=l
This procedure is developed in detail in Appendix A.
For the mode-ordinal rule, the maximum-likelihood cardinal
weights become:
(3-12)
Wi = 2-m
w i = 21-k
(i C (S ), m = 1, 2,...., k-l)
(i C (Sk))
3.3.5 Implications of the Various Alternatives
It is imperative that the decision maker be properly
informed of the various implications of these alternative
schemes for ranking rural penetration road projects. The
appropriate procedure is obviously situation and case
specific and is constrained by the type of value judgment
the analyst can elicit from the decision maker. In order to
demonstrate the various implications of these decision
rules, consider the set of six projects to be evaluated
under five objectives (assumed to be in preference order, as
given in Table 2). The ranking scores under each of the non-
cardinal decision rules are presented in Table 3.
These six projects all have the same total utility score
and, hence, are indistinguishable under the equal weights
decision rule. They were chosen to illustrate the implica-
tions of the ordinal decision rules since these are not
intuitively obvious by any means.
The ranking of projects produced by the max-ordinal
decision rule can be said to be of a less conservative/more
aggressive nature. That is, if a situation arises in which
the contribution to the preferred objective is exceptionally
good relative to that of any of the other objectives (which
might be exceptionally poor), the rule cannot take the
latter into account. If this inability to account for an
exceptionally poor objective measure is not a critical
issue, as long as there exists a more preferred objective
with an exceptionally good measure, use of the max-ordinal
decision rule may be justified. This situation is illustrat-
ed by Project E, which is ranked relatively high in Table 3,
Table 2
A SET OF HYPOTHETICAL PROJECTS
Utility Scores on Various Objectives
U1l
50
20
0
50
80
100
u 4 u5
0
80
25
100
20
75
95
50
50
5
50
50
55
20
75
45
80
25
50
80
100
50
20
0
Table 3
PROJECT RANKING UNDER VARIOUS DECISION RULES
Equal
50
50
50
50
50
50
Equal
*
*
*
*
*
Max
Ordinal
50
50
50
75
80
100
Max
Ordinal
3
2
1
Ranking Score
Min
Ordinal
25
20
0
50
50
50
Project Ranking
Mode
Ordinal
43
42
23
56
57
76
Min Mode
Ordinal Ordinal
4 4
*Denotes decision rule cannot identify rank positions for
these projects.
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Project
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although it scores poorly on the second objective. Addi-
tionally, as can be seen in Table 3, the max-ordinal rule
tends to make little distinction between those projects
appearing in the lower half of ranking; that is, it seeks
more to identify "good" projects, according to the ordering,
rather than "bad" projects.
The min-ordinal decision rule may, on the other hand, be
described as more conservative/less agressive in nature.
That is, the occurrence of an exceptionally poor objective
measure is taken into account by this decision rule, but it,
in turn, is unable to reflect the occurrence of an excep-
tionally good objective measure. If the ability to account
for a relatively poor objective measure is critical, as is
illustrated by the analogy of "a chain is as strong as its
weakest link," then use of the min-ordinal decision rule may
be justified. This situation is illustrated by Project B,
which is ranked relatively low in Table 3, although it
scores well on the second objective. The min-ordinal rule
tends to make little distinction between those projects
appearing in the upper half of the ranking, as may be seen
from Table 3; that is, it seeks more to identify (and
eliminate) "bad" projects according to the ordering of the
objectives rather than identify "good" projects.
The mode-ordinal rule may be regarded as "averagely"
conservative/aggressive in nature. The contributions of all
criterion measures are accounted for according to the most-
likely preferences indicated by the ordering. As can be seen
from Table 3, it may be regarded as a compromise between the
max-ordinal and min-ordinal decision rules since it ranks
the projects distinguished by either rule in a similar
manner.
A further limitation of both the max-ordinal and
min-ordinal decision rules, vis-a-vis the other rules, is
that the set of projects is not ranked according to a single
set of weights since those weights that maximize (minimize)
the score of one project will, in general, not be the same
as those maximizing (minimizing) another project's score.
The above discussion of ordinal rule implications is, of
course, directly applicable to the partial-ordinal decision
rules.
Finally, it should be stated that if the information is
available and believed reliable, use of the equal or cardi-
nal weighting techniques for ranking projects may be most
appropriate.
3.4 Processing Where No Consensus Exists
Often there are two or more decision makers who, having
agreed on objectives, cannot agree on the ranking--either
cardinal or ordinal. They wish, obviously, to be left room
to negotiate their own "unquantifiable" benefits and costs.
In this situation, the responsibility of the analyst is the
preparation and presentation of the evaluation in a manner
that will aid the decision makers by informing them of the
implications of each choice or set of choices. As Ato Hailu
Shawel, General Manager of the Ethiopian Road Authority(16)
said at 1975 conference on rural road evaluation,
"There might be, sometimes, non-scientific
decisions to be made,...contrary to figures
prepared by experts.... At least let us know what
we are deciding when we take that position. If we
decided to take Road C and it is, on our list,
number 15 in priority, at least we knew what we
were sacrificing when we took that field decision.
But at the moment we take decisions on figures, but
we do not know which item we picked actually."
Just as the social and political realities of a nation
preclude the use of only one objective--national income--in
choosing projects, the reality of budget or loan negotia-
tions may require the flexibility of more information but no
singular decision.
The ranking system given in Section 3.3 does not permit
the competitive decision makers access to tradeoffs without
referring back to the analyst. Furthermore, the analysis
would typically be too technical for them to
utilize it knowledgeably. Various graphic presentations
permit this to be done.
3.4.1 The Two Objective Space
Let us examine the project set J given in Table 4. Two
objectives have been identified: Net Region A income and
access to health care services. Net Region A income is in
million currency units ranging from 2 million to 11 million.
Health care access, the percentage of the 10,000 people
within the geographic domain of the clinic who would now
have access to the clinic, ranges from 20 to 100 percent.
This information can also be displayed as shown in Figure 5.
Table 4
Project Solution Net Region A Income Health Access
J1 10 60%
- .L
J2
J3
J4
J5
J6
J7
80%
80%
70%
20%
20%
100%
Presented with either Table 4 or Figure 5, a decision
maker, without attempting to aggregate regional income and
lives, might observe:
Figure 5
TWO OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS SPACE
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(1) J 5 and J 6 do not achieve a high enough health
access
(2) J 7 does, but at the expense of regional income
(3) J 2 and J 4 are inferior to J3
The choice is therefore reduced to set Jl and J3.
The final choice would depend on the perceived tradeoff
between 2 million units of regional income and reasonable
health access for 20 percent more people.
If, however, a constraint is present that states that
all investments must obtain not less than 75 percent health
access (line H-H on Figure 6), the decision is simplified
since J1 does not meet the constraint.
3.4.2 The Three Objective Space
Evaluation rarely involves only two objectives, and a
third could be the foreign exchange impact. If we add the
present value of the net foreign exchange consumption (in
millions) we have Table 5.
Table 5
Net Region Health Net Foreign
Project Solution A Income Access Exchange
Jl 10 60% 8
J2 6 80% 2
J3 8 80% 3
J4 8 70% 2
J5 4 20% 5
J6 11 20% 3
J7 2 100% 2
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The evaluation of this information in tabular form is
more difficult. Applying the 75 percent health access
constraint, we are left with the following subset:
Project Solution NRI FX
J2 6 2
J3 8 3
J7 2 2
Certainly, J 2 seems preferable to J7. What about
J2 versus J33? How does one compare 2 million units of
Region A income with 1 million of foreign exchange? If the
desire is to minimize foreign exchange consumption, choose
J2 over J3. Yet if foreign exchange conservation is so
important perhaps the 75 percent access cutoff may be too
rigid and J4 should be reconsidered. But what is the
tradeoff between 1 million units of foreign exchange and
access for 10 percent of the population? These data would
better be displayed graphically.
It should be noted that consumption of foreign exchange
is a negative concept. To facilitate the visual presentation
by maintaining the "bigger is better" orientation, the scale
for foreign exchange (FX) must be reversed. The resultant
graph (Figure 7) makes analysis more straightforward.
Project J5 is clearly dominated under all conditions. If
the subjective disposition of the decision maker is to go
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Figure 7
THREE OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS SPACE
Healti
for net regional income and health access, then Jl, is the
clear choice; if income and conservation of exchange
reserves, then J 6 ; and if health access and conservation
of reserves, the J7. If, however, the decision maker feels
that no pair of objectives dominates, then he needs to
consider J2, J 3 , and J4 from some other vantage point.
By passing plane H-H through the health access axis at
75 percent (Figure 8) we are left with J2, J 3 and J7-
Both J2 and J 3 are clearly superior to J 7 , as con-
cluded in the discussion of Table 5. The superiority of the
graphical presentation over tabular is the retention of
information even after the application of the cutoff for
health access.
3.4.3 The Multi-Objective Space
A boon compared to tabular display, graphic analysis
breaks down beyond three objectives (when displayed on a two
dimensional medium). Evaluation of four or more objectives
should use the strategy of minimum or maximum constraints
(such as the minimum of 75 percent for health access) to
reduce not only the set of solutions being evaluated but
also the number of objectives remaining. Using the 75
percent health access constraint, all but J 2 , J3, and
J7 are eliminated. We now add the fourth objective,
employment, in thousand labor years, as shown in Table 6.
Figure 8
THREE OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS SPACE
Table 6
Project Solution NRI FX Work Days Health Access
J2 6 2 10 80%
J3 8 3 6 80%
J7  2 2 3 100%
Figure 9 demonstrates that solution J 7 now clearly
appears a subset of J2. J2 and J3 trade-off 2 million
units of regional income for 40,000 labor years.
3.4.4 Information Loss and Graphic Distortion
Note how J7 is on one face of J2 and therefore a
subset of J2 . This is called information loss. By setting
a health access cutoff of 75 percent in order to display
other objectives, we no longer can identify the 20 percent
additional access achieved with solution J7 . If the
analyst provides the decision maker only with Figure 9, no
tradeoff can be entertained on this 20 percent. This sug-
gests both tabular presentation as well as multiple graphi-
cal displays, supported by caveats whenever information loss
occurs.
A second cautionary note involves graphic distortion.
Solution J2 appears somewhat (though not excessively)
better than solution J 3 in Figure 9; Figure 10 shows J2
to be overwhelmingly better (bigger). The shifted axes and
distorted scales also make J 7 appear competitive with J3.
Figure 9
THREE OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS
AFTER APPLICATION OF HEALTH ACCESS CUTOFF
NRI
FX
Figure 10
THREE OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS FROM FIGURE 9
WITH SHIFTED AXES AND ADJUSTED SCALES
3.4.5 Project Selection in Multi-Objective Space
The concept of rank ordering mutually exclusive invest-
ment options is a carry-over from single objective analysis.
Ranking is basically a linear concept that is inappropriate
in much of multi-objective analysis. It is impossible to
rank in multi-objective space without explicitly weighting
factors that relate not only national to regional to foreign
exchange currency units, but also currency to health access
to work days. If the decision maker is willing to set these
weights for the decision-making process, the analyst should
use the numerical methods discussed earlier.
It is this very difficulty, the eventual requirement of
weighting and unification in order to effect ranking, that
has in part kept multi-objective analysis from being used
more fully. Faced with a linear ranking of investment
choices, the decision maker can choose with some facility.
Referring again to the quote from Ato Hailu Shawel (16), the
decision maker can choose a project, know it is number 15,
and accept the consequences with the justification of
"other" objectives. This form of casual choice, where the
"blame" rests on the technican, is not available in
multi-objective graphic analysis. These "other" objectives
are specifically identified by the analysts and evaluated
for all projects and the results supplied to the decision
maker for project selection. Selection may proceed in two
ways.
a. Project Selection - by Project
Project selection can be performed in much the same
manner as the solution evaluation methodology described
above. This would essentially perform the function of
removing inferior projects from the set, that is, projects
wholly interior to or on the face of another project.
Of the projects remaining, should their total cost
exceed the budget, elimination would proceed based on sub-
jective trade-offs applied by the decision maker. If the
trade-offs were quantifiable, they should have already been
incorporated into the analysis procedure.
b. Project Selection - by Strategy
A second method of project selection, available at the
analyst level, would involve grouping of projects into
strategy sets. Assuming once again that the sum of all
projects exceeds the budget, the analyst composes a series
of strategies that meet the budget constraint. Within the
budget constraint, however, many other objectives can be
maximized. For instance, one strategy could emphasize
balancing regional investment, another maximizing health
access, another maximizing net national incomes, another
maximizing net regional incomes, and another minimizing
consumption of foreign exchange. Strategy identification
proceeds as project evaluation.
Presenting strategies that emphasize each objective of
interest to the decision maker while meeting the budget
constraint facilitates the decision process. If several
objectives have primary importance (for example, budget
constraint and balancing regional investment), a series of
strategies could be defined that closely achieve both these
objectives while emphasizing, in each different strategy, a
third objective.
For each of these strategies, discussions of the effects
of each optimization should be provided. When any one
objective is maximized (minimized), the effect on all other
objectives should be discussed. In addition, to show the
relative extent of each maximization strategy, a fully
optimized strategy should be presented that would represent
the maximization of that objective function without the
budgetary (or other primary) constraint assumption.
3.5 Summary
This chapter presented the multi-objective analytical
problem in terms of the level of consensus/disparity amongst
decision makers. For each of these levels, an appropriate
technique for treatment of the multiple objectives was
developed. These techniques fall into two broad categories
depending upon the degree of consensus. Chapter 4 presents
an application of the methodology where consensus exists;
Chapter 5, where it does not.
Chapter Four
APPLICATION OF THE METHODOLOGY WHERE CONSENSUS EXISTS
Chapter 3 presented a set of methodologies for
evaluating projects with multiple objectives. This chapter
will demonstrate, using a hypothetical example, how to
evaluate and rank 36 projects using five criteria and five
decision rules. The criteria are economic benefits, economic
costs, distribution, employment, and access to services. The
decision rules are equal weights on the criteria, cardinal
weights, ordinal ranking and two cases of partial ordinal
ranking.
A hypothetical case study (17) involving some 36 alter-
native projects was designed for the purpose of demonstra-
ting the use of the overall appraisal framework (details are
given in Appendix C). A typical project might be as
follows:
A 20-kilometer feeder road project is proposed to
join a small agricultural community of some 600 persons
to a small provincial market town served by a good
secondary road. At present an earth trail, not passable
by motor vehicles, exists and is mainly used for walking
or transport by pack animals to the nearby town,
where the peasants periodically go to sell agricultural
surplus or purchase consumer goods. The community
appears to have suitable environmental conditions for
agricultural development.
As part of a regional development effort, a package
of investment projects has been proposed by the design
team, including upgrading the donkey trail to a gravel
road; implementing agricultural extension services
directed toward improving existing production, increasing
the area of land under cultivation, and introducing a new
crop, cocoa; establishing a health clinic in the
community; and providing general primary education for
the first time in the community.
The community has some 109 families, of which 5 are
relatively rich and own between 45 and 50 hectares of
land each, 34 families own 2 to 10 hectares each, and 70
are landless (50 of these rent a total of 100 hectares
from the rich for subsistence farming, and the other 20
work for the rich families). Present production consists
of cassava, rice, and maize and some livestock on 405
hectares of land; an additional 113 hectares of
cultivatable land is currently idle. It is proposed to
bring this land under cultivation with a new cash crop,
cocoa, as well as an additional 70 hectares of nearby
government land, the latter to be allotted to the 70
landless families. The target population is thus 104
families who currently own 278 hectares of land, which
will be increased to 348 hectares by 'the project.
Given this sort of information, contributions to the
various criteria were identified and measured in their
appropriate units, as discussed in Chapter Two. This
represents just one of the myriad possible scenarios for
feeder road projects. Corresponding descriptions for the
other 35 projects could be created. In the case at hand, a
spectrum of plausible measures was simply developed. Using
the utility assessment techniques described in Chapter Two,
preference functions were developed for each criterion and
utility values assessed for each project's contribution to
each of the five criteria. The set of values developed and
used in the case study is given in Table 7.
A review of the figures in the table shows considerable
variation in the contributions of the 36 projects to the
five criteria. Patterns in these differences are difficult
to establish because they depend on the specific circum-
stances of each particular project. An extreme project may
have, for example, the best contribution with respect to one
criterion and the worst with respect to another. Project 4
has such characteristics with regard to economic benefits
and distribution, respectively. This is an example of a
situation where the land in the project area of influence is
owned by rich landlords who will be able to take advantage
of the transport improvement, resulting in high economic
benefits in the form of induced agricultural production but
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Table 7
UTILITY OF THE CRITERIA MEASURES, ui(xi,j)
Project
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
Economic
Benefits
34.09
30.22
15.69
100.00
90.43
73.88
41.35
34.62
20.77
11.15
30.22
39.43
41.35
36.17
29.44
77.14
79.93
19.81
3.30
0.00
44.54
30.39
63.84
48.30
21.16
25.00
53.93
29.81
6.73
13.36
60.31
37.52
32.98
27.21
30.77
35.83
Economic
Costs
61.82
17.66
37.91
31.26
72.67
58.90
55.67
80.23
81.81
82.26
77.86
59.87
38.40
31.67
44.46
48.64
2.76
94.99
95.85
100.00
84.08
69.78
0.00
13.61
50.00
67.04
38.55
29.55
67.06
50.00
47.73
38.40
8.14
72.74
34.93
28.26
Distribution
21.58
54.79
20.13
0.00
0.99
1.25
27.63
40.13
56.46
75.00
12.04
11.58
82.14
95.80
76.07
54.38
29.00
12.17
5.46
11.18
0.33
100.00
52.50
41.00
70.83
27.50
50.00
82.14
87.68
54.58
40.38
37.75
11.97
24.47
15.26
9.14
Empl oy-
ment
83.04
100.00
13.71
45.23
24.48
28.90
88.02
73.81
46.26
16.42
43.94
58.79
89.39
90.49
58.27
52.41
33.07
75.49
0.00
1.61
31.85
45.97
68.12
57.81
9.68
46.50
67.18
60.93
31.85
37.90
56.25
81.24
46.37
51.87
58.12
46.40
Note: For all criteria except economic costs, the lowest
attainment is assigned a utility of 0 and the highest
100; the situation is reversed for economic costs
where the highest cost is assigned a utility of 0 and
the lowest 100.
Source: Chew (17)
Accessi-
bility
to Social
Services
42.79
52.03
33.28
20.21
10.21
14.99
31.26
27.04
15.61
32.14
24.53
19.14
71.45
88.25
52.56
40.36
27.01
11.88
5.13
0.00
14.50
27.03
45.21
100.00
17.80
22.63
38.75
51.25
27.00
43.75
45.00
51.29
57.50
6.38
45.38
41.18
low in distribution effects in the sense that the poor
farmer targets will reap only an insignificant amount of
these benefits.
The various utility scores for each project were then
combined and used in ranking the projects following the
procedures outlined in Chapter Three. The mechanisms for the
decision maker's articulation of preferences concerning the
various criteria were tested under one or more sets of
assumptions. Thus, the equal weights alternative, the
ordinal weights alternative under max-, min- and mode-
ordinal decision rules, the partial-ordinal alternative with
the criteria in the same order for two different partial-
specifications under max-and min-ordinal decision rules, and
the cardinal weights alternative with the same order of
criteria but three sets of weights were used for ranking the
projects. Table 8 outlines the various ranking techniques
employed, while Table 9 shows the alternative rankings of
the set of projects achieved under these various assumptions
as to a decision maker's level of information and
preferences.
4.1 Single-Rule Ranking of Projects
The ranking of projects by means of the equal-weights
assumption (E) depends on their relative performance with
regard to each criterion and in total. Projects ranked at
the top tend to be uniformly good (for example, Project 16),
or relatively good in two or more criteria and not too bad
Table 8
DECISION RULES USED IN THE CASE STUDY
Equal weights on the criteria
Cardinal weights on the criteria
Weights, wi
wl w2 w3 w4 w5
50 20 15 10
22 21 20 19 18
- Ordinal ranking of criteria
Preferential Ordering of Criteria, x i
max-ordinal
min-ordinal
mode-ordinal
Rul e
X1 > x2 > x3 > x4 > x5
- Partial ordinal ranking of criteria
Preferential Ordering of Criteria, x i
max-ordinal
min-ordinal
max-ordinal
min-ordinal
xl > (x2 = x3 = x4 = x5)
(xl = x2) > (x3 = x4 = x 5 )
where: > denotes "is preferred to"
1 - economic benefits
2 - economic costs
i = 3 - distribution
4 - employment
5 - accessability to social services
Source: Brademeyer (15)
Rul e
Rul e
- --
- - ----
TABLE 9
A Summary Comparison of Project Rankings Using Different Decision Rules
1 I Preference Cardinal Preference Ordinal Preference Partial ordinal Preferenre(Rank E C1 I C2 C T Max Min Mode P-Max P-Minl P-Max 2 i P-Min 2
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2
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9
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33
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5 31 14
17 27 6
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13 7 16
23 5 18
31 4 8
22 12
27 32
15 14
24 6
8 21
2 8
28 17
32 1
7 36
1 33
21 35
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11
31
15
24
9
2
28
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34
27
17
10 2 19
18 11 32
29 28 7
30 15 1
12 34 10
26 26 26
11 25 23
35 9 17
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25
33
3
20
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Source: Koch (17)
I I Equal
9
_
2
32
12
26
11
15
29
34
6
21
17
14
25
35
36
23
30
24
28
3
2
20
9
33
I
i
i
Ordinal Preference Partial Ordinal Preference
in those remaining (for example, Projects 13, 14); those
near the bottom tend to be uniformly poor (Project 3), or
relatively poor in several criteria and maybe even quite
good in one or two (Projects 19, 20). Such generalizations
must be treated with some caution, however, because the
ranking of projects is highly dependent on the particular
projects in the set. It might also be noted that assigning
some 36 separate rankings may be somewhat deceptive, in that
certain of the projects may be rather close in terms of the
numerical values underlying their rankings (for example,
projects ranked 5 to 14 are within 7 percent) and may thus
be relatively equally desirable, at least at first glance.
In view of this, it is generally recommended that the values
be looked at in conjunction with the rankings (see Chew
(17)). Nevertheless, the strength of this appraisal
framework is as a mechanism for sorting and ordering a large
number of projects, and thereby selecting a group of poten-
tially appropriate projects for further and more detailed
inspection. These comments naturally pertain to all ranking
approaches.
The ranking of a particular project, when cardinal
weights, C, are specified, depends both on the relative
weights on the individual criteria and on the project's
performance relative to that of other projects in the set.
Not surprisingly, C2 's behavior is similar to that of E
because the weights on the criteria are nearly uniform. C1
and C3 show different rankings, however, because both sets
of weights are balanced in favor of the first criterion,
C1 somewhat so and C3 90 percent. In the case of C1,
for example, projects with a reasonably high measure on the
first one or two criteria and less high on the others tend
to rank high (Projects 4, 5), while those with a reasonably
low measure on the first criterion and still a relatively
high measure on the others tend to rank low (Project 30).
Distinct differences exist in the rankings obtained from
C1 and C3 , as exemplified by Projects 17 and 22, with
differences in the emphasis on the second criterion playing
an important role here.
The ranking of projects by means of the ordinal weights
assumption depends on the final decision rule (max-, min-,
or mode-ordinal), the ordering of the criteria, and the
relative performance of the projects in the set. The five
top-ranked projects under the max-ordinal decision rule
demonstrate its aggressive nature in that the contribution
of the most preferred criterion, economic benefits,
overshadows those of all other criteria; Project 4 is an
extreme example. Once contributions to the less preferred
criteria become larger than that to the most preferred
criterion, however, these former measures begin to exert
some influence, as in the case of Project 14. The more
conservative nature of the min-ordinal decision rule is
evident in the lowering of Project 4's ranking and in the
low ranks of Project 19 and 20. The observation that the
ordinal rankings are similar is valid, but one cannot then
proceed to assume that the rankings under other rules will
also be similar, as is clearly demonstrated by the results
in Table 9. Some similarities do exist, as in the top-ranked
projects, but striking differences also exist, as in the
case of Project 22. Figure 11 shows the upper and lower
bounds for each project together with the scores under the
equal-weights alternative.
There is, within the specification of cardinal weights,
an infinite number of specifications that parallel the
ordinal ranking of the criteria, but that result in differ-
ent rankings for the projects. The mode-ordinal rule uses
the "most likely" set of cardinal weights based on the
ordering of the criteria, and is, in a sense, a "compro-
mise" between the min-ordinal and max-ordinal decision rules
in that it computes the most likely project score while the
other rules compute lower and upper bounds. While not always
literally true, this can be observed from the rankings of
over half of all projects. Figure 12 shows the upper and
lower bounds provided by the max-ordinal and min-ordinal
decision rules, and the "averaging" effect of the
mode-ordinal rule is clearly depicted.
The partial-ordinal decision rules represent a
"weakening" of the max-ordinal and min-ordinal decision
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Figure 11. Upper and Lower Ordinal Bounds for the Projects, and Equal Weights Scores
Source: Brademeyer (15)
RANGE OF SCORES FOR EACH PROJECT GIVEN ORDER OF CRITERIA: (X >X >X >X >X )
1 2 3 4 5
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
PROJECT NUMBER
Figure 12. Averaging Effects of Mode-Ordinal Rule
Source: Brademeyer (15)
100
0C_
mW
m
--i
3O
I-t
rules in that subsets of criteria are, in effect, averaged
before they are combined. Figure 13 depicts the partial
ordinal specification (xl=x2) > (x3=x4=x5) upper
and lower bounds for each project against the pure ordinal
(Xl>x 2 >x 3 >x 4 >x 5 ) bounds for each project, and the
narrowing of the range of possible scores is clearly
evident.
In order to better understand the use and implications
of the various decision rules and their associated
preferences and information requirements, the behavior of
three projects across these alternatives is traced, and an
effort is made to account for this in terms of the project's
particular characteristics and contributions to the various
criteria. The movement of Project 4 is particularly
interesting as a result of its extremes in attainment of the
various criteria: it has the highest utility score for the
economic benefits criterion and the lowest for the distri-
butional one, with its score on the remaining criteria
moderate to low. Thus, when equal weights (E) or nearly
equal cardinal weights (C2) are specified, it ranks around
number 21. When cardinal weights with relatively higher
weight on economic benefits and lower on distributional
effects (Cl) are applied, Project 4 moves up to position
3, and up to a number 1 when the extremes in the weights are
made greater yet (C3 ). The respectively aggressive and
conservative natures of max-ordinal and min-ordinal decision
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Figure 13. Restriction of Project Score Ranges due to Partial Ordinal Preference
Source: Brademeyer (15)
rules are well depicted by Projects 4's behavior under the
stated preferential orderings of the criteria. It ranks
number 1 with the max-ordinal decision rule, since its
highest score is attained on the most preferred criterion,
and number 7 with the min-ordinal decision rule. The number
3 ranking under the mode-ordinal rule again shows its
"averaging" effect. These relative rankings are present
again in the partial-ordinal decision rules, with lower
scores under P-Max2 since that specification averages the
scores on the first two criteria, or, in this case 100 and
31, which is still relatively good although not so much as
when the first criterion stood alone.
The performance of Project 22 with respect to three out
of five criteria is good (economic costs and employment) to
excellent (distribution - top rated), and with respect to
the remaining two it is relatively poor but not lowest. Its
score on economic benefits is rather poor (30), and thus it
ranks low, around 20, under C3 , which puts nearly all its
emphasis on this criterion, and under the min-ordinal rule,
for which this criterion is most preferred. Its generally
favorable performance with regard to the other criteria
brings its rank up to 7 for the max-ordinal rule and up into
the range of 2 to 9 for the equal, cardinal, and mode-
ordinal schemes. Its performance under P-Max 1 and P-Minl
parallels that of the max-ordinal and min-ordinal rankings,
being 3 lower in each case, because in this specification
the last four criteria are unordered, whereas Project 22 has
its scores generally increasing in the direction of
preference. Under P-Max 2 it ranks identically as under
P-Max1 in that its highest score comes from the contri-
butions of all criteria. However, it ranks number 3 under
P-Min 2 , identical to its position under the equal weights
alternative, due to its above average scores in three of the
five criteria.
Projects 3's performance is relatively poor with regard
to all the criteria, but most particularly employment,
economic benefits, and distribution. Correspondingly, it
ranks rather low for all decision rules, although it tends
to rise a bit when the min-ordinal rules are used because of
its uniformly poor performance without any extreme lows in
its utility scores.
The results achieved in the form of ranking the projects
in the hypothetical case study through the application of
various decision rules within the overall appraisal frame-
work naturally vary from one approach to the next because
different value judgments and amounts of information have
been provided in each case. It is not possible to suggest
definitively which decision rule is the "best and only one"
in the ranking of such a set of projects. Its selection is
most appropriately made on a case-by-case basis taking into
account, for example, the nature of the projects involved
and their expected contributions to development, the
socio-political environment within which the planning is
being done, and the type of value judgments the decision
maker can and is willing to make. Adequate understanding by
the analyst and proper education of the decision maker
concerning the properties and implications of the various
decision rules are thus essential to successful implementa-
tion of the "single-rule" framework for project appraisal.
4.2 Ranking of Projects Under "Rule-Uncertainty"
Having presented a ranking of the projects under the
various decision rules, based on the information provided by
the decision maker, the situation may still arise wherein
the decision maker is unsure about which rule to use. This
is particularly likely in the ordinal-preference case and
might be referred to as "rule uncertainty." While no one
rule can be stated as superior, the implications of the
various rules in terms of relative costs and benefits
achieved can be further elaborated.
More concretely, imagine that our decision maker has
stated an ordinal preference, x 1 >X2 >X3 >x4>X5, that
he wishes to implement for 9 of the possible 36 projects,
but that he is not confident in his ability to choose the
"best" list from Table 9. Based on this information, the
rankings under the various ordinal rules can be produced, a
recommended "best" list can be generated, and the
socioeconomic impacts of the various options can be
summarized, as in Table 10.
Table 10 shows the 11 top-ranked projects under the
equal weights, max-, min-, and mode-ordinal decision rules,
along with a "recommended" ranking of the projects for
implementation. The recommended list is intended to show the
decision maker the "correlation," if any, between the
various rankings, and thus the sensitivity/insensitivity of
the project ranking to the rule actually chosen. In addi-
tion, it produces a new ranking of its own, which is in
large part a "compromise" between the various decision
rules.
The "recommended" ranking is done as follows: the top-
ranked project is the one that appears highest in all but
one of the decision-rule rankings; the second-ranked project
is the one that appears next highest in all but one of the
lists and so on. Ties are broken based on the total of the
ranks in the top three lists. In the case at hand, Project
16 is recommended number one because it is ranked in the top
four for all decision rules and no other project performs
better. Projects 5 and 13 are ranked in the top six by three
decision rules each; however, the total rank of Project 5 in
its three lists is 9 (1 + 2 + 6), while that of Project 13
is 13 (2 + 5 + 6); so project 5 is ranked second and Project
13 third. Projects 4 and 22 rank at least seventh in three
Table 10
TOP NINE PROJECTS UNDER ORDINAL DECISION RULES
Equal Ordinal Preference Rules
Weights Max Min Mode Recommendeda
4 16 5
5 31 16
17 27 4
16 7 6
6 13 31
14 5 13
22 4 22
13 32 27
21 12 14
23 6 8
31 21 17
16
5
13
4
22
14
31
6
27
Average utility scores over nine projects, Ui(xij)b
Rule ul u2 u3 u4 u 5
Equal weights
Max-ordinal
Min-ord inal
Mode-ordinal
Recommended
2 -11
26 - 3
- 4
25 - 3
25 - 3
2 - 2
- 5
9
9
19 22
aRecommended list is ranked on order in which projects
appear in at least three decision rule lists.
bUtility scores equal increase over average utility of
each criterion over all projects.
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Rank
14
13
22
16
15
24
8
2
289
10
11
31
27
lists, with Project 4 having the higher total rank (11 vs.
17), so they are ranked fourth and fifth, respectively.
Project 14 is the only remaining project to rank at least
ninth in three lists, so it is recommended as the sixth
project. Projects 31 and 6 both appear at least tenth in
three lists, with Project 31 having the higher total rank
(17 vs. 19), so they rank seventh and eighth, respectively.
Project 27 fills out the group of nine recommended projects.
This procedure produces an intersection of the various
rankings, placing equal weight on each decision rule. More
interesting than those included in the recommended list, how-
ever, are those omitted for each decision rule. For example,
consider the max-ordinal ranking, which is aggressive as
regards the interpretation of the ordinal preferences: eight
of its top eleven projects are in the recommended list.
Those omitted have the following utility scores on the
ordered criteria:
Project 17 - 79.93 2.76 29.00 33.07 27.01
Project 21 - 44.54 84.08 0.33 31.85 14.50
Project 23 - 63.84 0.00 52.50 68.12 45.21
Project 17, which ranks third under the max-ordinal
rule, is rejected because it depends entirely on the first
criteria, being poor to lowest on the others. Project 21,
which was ranked ninth, does well only on the second
criteria and thus is rejected, while Project 23, ranked
tenth, is omitted due to its extremely high costs (score 0
on the second criteria).
For the min-ordinal case, 3 of the top 10 projects are
omitted; they had the following scores:
Project 7 - 41.35 55.67 27.63 88.02 31.26
Project 32 - 37.52 38.40 37.75 81.24 51.29
Project 12 - 39.43 59.87 11.58 58.79 19.14
These projects, which are quite similar, were rejected
because their scores are "uncorrelated" with the stated
ordinal preference. For the mode-ordinal rule, all of its
top nine projects are in the recommended list, indicating
again its "averaging" effects as regards the max-ordinal and
min-ordinal rules and that its ranking is based on the
"most-likely" scores for the projects.
Five of the top 11 projects under the equal-weights
alternative were omitted, although the top four were
included. These projects had the following characteristics:
Project 15 - 29.44 44.46 76.07 58.27 52.56
Project 24 - 48.30 13.61 41.00 57.81 100.00
Project 8 - 34.62 80.23 40.13 73.81 27.04
Project 2 - 30.22 17.66 54.79 100.00 52.03
Project 28 - 29.81 29.55 82.14 60.93 51.25
Of these, Project 8 is uncorrelated with the ordering,
while the rest are negatively correlated; thus, their high
average scores do not reflect the preferences stated by the
decision maker.
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The discussion so far has been of the inclusion/omission
of projects in the production of the recommended ranking. It
is also useful to present to the decision maker the
cost/benefit impacts of those inclusions and omissions.
Table 10 gives the difference between the average utility
score for each criterion, considering the top nine projects
under each decision rule, and the average utility score for
that criterion considering all 36 projects.* Thus, positive
scores indicated points above average and negative scores
indicated points below average.
From Table 10, the equal-weights alternative produces
about average economic benefits (criterion one) and very
good distribution, employment, and accessibility benefits
(criteria 3, 4, and 5) at above average cost (negative score
on criterion 2). The max-ordinal rule, on the other hand,
produces very good economic benefits with about average
performance on the other criteria. The min-ordinal rule
produces slightly less economic benefits at slightly greater
cost, with a small net increase in the other social benefit
measures. The mode-ordinal rule produces almost the same
economic benefits as the max-ordinal at the same cost, but
provides above average social benefits as well. The
recommended ranking in this case contains the same nine
*The average utility for each criterion over all projects
was not 50, but rather the mean utilities were 38.07,
52.07, 38.70, 50.59, and 34.85 for the five criteria,
respectively.
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projects as the mode-ordinal ranking and hence has the same
average utility scores.
While it would seem clear in this case that the
recommended ranking should be the one implemented by the
decision maker based on the relative utility scores and the
stated ordinal preference, the actual choice still remains
up to him. The types of information provided above are
intended solely to help him make that decision and to feel
confident about its soundness.
4.3 Ranking of Projects Under "Ordinal-Uncertainty"
Suppose that we have through the above demonstrations
gained the decision maker's confidence in the appraisal
framework given a statement of his ordinal preferences.
Furthermore, suppose that the decision maker, when asked to
specify a "real" ordinal preference for the case at hand,
expresses uncertainty (or equivalently, that there are
several decision makers, each of whom has different
preferences). Taking the latter interpretation, suppose
there is a committee of three decision makers (call them A,
B, and C) from whom we elicit the following statements of
ordinal preference:
A: "I feel that economic benefits are most important
and that costs must take precedence over other
social objectives. I prefer income distribution to
employment, with health and educational considera-
tions being of lower priority."
B: "I agree that economic benefits are the most
important, but I am unable to state a preference
among the other criteria."
C: "Economic benefits must be balanced against costs,
but they are of greater immediate need than the
social objectives of income distribution,
employment, and accessibility to social services,
which are all equally desirable."
We would interpret these rather imprecise statements as
the following ordinal preferences:
A: (x1 > x2 > x3 > x4 > x5 )
B: xl > (x2 = x3 = x4 = x5)
C: (xI = x2 ) > (x3 = x4 = x5 )
How do we reconcile these preferences so that the
committee can reach a consensus, or compromise, on which
projects to implement? The following procedure might
suffice. First, for each decision maker, generate the
project rankings under the various decision-rules along with
a recommended ranking; second, with each decision maker,
establish which ranking scheme "best" reflects his true
preferences; and third, combine the three most-preferred
lists into a final recommended list that the decision makers
can then use to reach their consensus.
From the 36 projects in Table 7, we would produce for
each decision maker the project rankings under the equal-
weights, max-ordinal, and min-ordinal decision rules,* along
with a recommended "compromise" ranking and the socio-
economic impacts of each. Assuming again that nine projects
are to be implemented, we would have the results presented
in Tables 10, 11, and 12 for decision makers A, B, and C,
respectively.
The implications of A's preferences have been discussed
in the previous section, and we will assume here that he has
agreed that the recommended ranking in Table 10 reflects his
preference satisfactorily.
Decision maker B (Table 11) has entered our discussion
convinced that the aggressive max-ordinal rule should most
nearly reflect his preferences. When shown that we recommend
the omission of his third and fifth ranked projects, the
inclusion of his tenth ranked, and the addition of Project
24, he needs to know the reasons. Our justification might
proceed as follows given the characteristics of the projects
in question in terms of their deviation from the average
over all projects:
*The mode-ordinal decision-rule was omitted for decision
makers B and C in that this rule is identical to the
equal-weights case for their stated ordinal preferences.
This is discussed in detail in Appendix B.
Table 11
TOP NINE PROJECTS UNDER (xI > (x2 = x3 = x 4 = x 5 )
Ordinal Preference
Equal Ordinal Decision Rules
Rank Weights Max Min Recommendeda
1 14 4 16 16
2 13 5 51 14
3 22 17 27 13
4 16 16 24 24
5 15 6 23 5
6 24 14 13 23
7 8 13 7 4
8 2 23 5 31
9 28 31 4 22
10 31 22 12
Average utility scores for each criterion, Ui (xi,j)b
Rul e u2 u3 u4 u5
Equal weights
Max-ordinal
Min-ord inal
Recommended
3
1
2
2 -11
1 -15
5 -14
3 -10
31 10 22
1 4 5
0 10 10
14 9 8
aRecommended rank is based on order in which projects
appear in at least two decision-rule lists.
bUtility scores represent increments over the average
utility over all projects for each criterion.
--- ------- - --
omitted: Project 17 - 42 -49 -10 -18 - 8
Project 6 - 36 7 -37 -22 -20
added: Project 22 - - 8 18 61 - 5 - 8
Project 24 - 10 -38 2 7 65
Decision maker B has stated that economic benefits are
his primary concern, while the other objectives are less
important and equivalent with one another. However, he has
not stated how much more important that criterion is or
whether it is more important than all others combined. To
clarify his true preferences, we note that the two projects
that we recommend be omitted have a total of 78 points above
average on the economic benefits criterion and a total of
-157 points on all other criteria. The projects that we
recommend be added have a total of 2 points above average on
the economic benefits criterion and 102 points on all other
criteria. Thus, we pose the following question to decision
maker B: "Are 76 economic benefit points (78-2) of more
importance to you than 259 (102-157) points for the other
criteria?" For the remainder of this discussion, we will
assume B answered negatively and accepted the recommended
ranking. From his stated preferences, it is not expected
that the min-ordinal or equal-weights rules will reflect B's
interests, as can be seen from Table 11.
Decision maker C (Table 12) is more cautious than B and
anticipates the min-ordinal rule as most reflective of his
preferences. We would recommend to him the elimination of
Table 12
TOP NINE PROJECTS UNDER ((xl = x2 ) > (x3 = x4 =x 5 ))
Ordinal Preference
Equal Ordinal Decision Rules
Rank Weights Max Min Recommendeda
1 14 5 16 14
2 13 14 8 22
3 22 6 22 16
4 16 4 31 13
5 15 13 7 8
6 24 21 1 31
7 8 16 27 18
8 2 18 9 27
9 28 8 10 5
10 31 22 18
11 27 31 13
12 32 15 5
Average utility scores for each criterion, u i (xi,j)b
Rule ul u2  u3  u4 u5
Equal weights 2 -11 31 19 22
Max-ordinal 19 8 - 7 6 - 2
Min-ordinal 2 11 13 8 - 2
Recommended 11 6 14 13 5
aRecommended rank is based on order in which projects
appear in at least two decision-rule lists.
bUtility scores represent increments over the average
utility over all projects for each criterion.
Projects 7, 1i, 9, and 10 and the addition of Projects 18,
13, 5, and 14. The characteristics of these projects, in
terms of deviation from the mean, are as follows:
omitted:
added:
Project
Project
Project
Project
Project
Project
Project
Project
7
1
9
10
18
13
5
14
- 3 4 -11 37 - 4
- - 4 10 -17 32 8
- -17 30 18 - 4 -19
- -27 30 36 -34 - 3
29 39
- -18 43 -27 25 -23
- 3 -14 43 39 37
- 52 21 -38 -26 -25
- - 2 -20 57 40 53
65 155
Combining these scores for each group according to C's
preferences, (xl + x 2 ) and (x 3 + x 4 + x 5 ), we pose
him the following question: "Are -36 points for economic
costs and benefits (29-65) of more importance to you than
116 points for social objectives (155-39)?" In this case, we
do know C's answer, since the recommended projects perform
better on both considerations than those omitted from the
min-ordinal ranking.
Decision maker C also accepts our recommended ranking of the
projects. *
Having satisfied each decision maker in turn as to the
proper ranking of projects according to his preferences, we
now must help them reach a consensus on the nine projects to
be implemented. From the three recommended rankings, one for
each decision maker, we produce a "final recommendation" as
shown in Table 13. As can be seen from the rankings, some
projects are omitted from each decision maker's list. We
will discuss each in turn.
For decision maker A, we recommend he compromise by
accepting his tenth ranked project (8) in place of his
eighth ranked project (6). The two projects have the
following characteristics in terms of deviations from the
mean utilities:
Project 6 - 36 7 -37 -22 -20
Project 8 - - 3 28 1 23 - 8
Decision maker A has a complex preference structure so
that it may indeed be rather difficult for him to evaluate
this comparison. The benefit picture of the overall
implementation package, given one or the other of the above
*If C had favored the max-ordinal rule, we could develop
the following question from the data in Table 12: "Are 10
points for economic costs and benefits (27-17) of more
importance to you than 35 points for social objectives (32
--3)?" Again, while we cannot provide C's answer, we
assume he answers in the negative.
Table 13
TOP NINE PROJECTS UNDER ALL ORDINAL PREFERENCES
Reccrmended Rankings for Ordinal Preferences
Rank xl>x2 >x3 >x4 >x5 xl>(x 2 =x3 =x4=x5 ) (xi=x2)>(x3=x4 =x5 ) Recammendeda
10 8 27 15
Average Utility Scores for Each Criterion,ul (xi ,j)b
Ordinal Preference Ul
xl>x2>x3>x4>x5  25 -3 9 5 5
xl>(x 2=x3=x4=x5) 23 -10 14 9 8
xl=x2>x 3=x4=X5  11 6 14 13 5
Final Recommended 17 0 13 10 6
aRecommended rank is based on order in which projects appear in at least
two recoamended lists.
bUtility scores represent increments over the average utility over
ects for each.criterion.
all proj-
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projects, may be easier for the decision maker to evaluate.
From Table 13, we would have:
with Project 6 - 25 - 3 9 5 5
with Project 8 - 17 0 13 10 6
Given this formulation, A might well agree to the compro-
mise as consistent with his overall preferences, depending
on his relative weight on the first (economic benefits)
criterion.
Decision maker B has a "simple" preference function, but
is asked to compromise on two of his projects, although one
of the replacments was ranked as his tenth choice. Thus, we
would have the following:
replace Project 24 - 10 -38 2 7 65
Project 23 - 26 -52 14 18 10
36
with Project 27 - 16
Project 8 - - 3
26
-14 11 17 4
28 1 23 - 8
13 62
In other words, would he accept the substitution of 36
points on the last four criteria for 23 points on the most
preferred, economic benefits criterion?
Decision maker C is being asked to accept the
substitution of Project 4 for Project 18, and thus must
compare the following:
replace Project 18 - -18 43 -27 25 -23
25 -25
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with Project 4 - 62 -21 -39 - 5 -15
41 -59
In other words, would C accept an increase of 16
economic costs and benefits points for a loss of 34 social
objective points?
A few points should be clarified here. First, the
application of the "recommended" rule in this case is truly
a compromise situation since its application to the case of
each decision maker has already produced the "best" ranking
according to the preference of each; that is, it is likely
that no one will "gain" from this exercise. Second, it is
very difficult to compare projects one on one, or two on two
if one's preferences are complex, due to the fluctuations of
the scores from project to project on the various criteria.
It may be much easier to reach a consensus if the entire
package of projects to be implemented is compared to that
preferred by each decision maker, rather than only those
projects to be omitted/included. The scores for the
recommended package might be acceptable to all if presented
as in the lower portion of Table 13, where the "compromise"
nature of the recommendations is clearly evident. Figure 14
shows this in Venn diagram form.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the projects
accepted individually according to each decision maker's
preferences were highly correlated with the projects finally
recommended: 9 of the top 10 for A, 8 of the top 10 for B,
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Figure 14
Compromise Among Top Nine Recommended Ordinal Preference Ranking
>'X5 )
B C
(x >(x 2=x x )) ((x =x )>( =x =x )1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4
ects are not in the final nine
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NOTE: Underlined (_) proj
recommended projects.
and 8 of the top 10 for C. In such cases, reaching a
consensus should not be very difficult.
4.4 Ranking of Projects Under "Cardinal-Uncertainty"
The procedures outlined in the previous section pertain
also to the situation in which our committee of decision
makers specifies various cardinal preferences. In this case,
the "recommended" ranking is generated from the rankings
under the equal-weights, mode-ordinal, and cardinal-weights
decision rules, since these are the only cardinal rules
available. Imagine that our committee has given the
following cardinal preferences, with the criteria in the
same order as before:
x: (50, 20, 15, 10, 5)
y: (22, 21, 20, 19, 18)
z: (90, 4, 3, 2, 1)
The recommended rankings are developed in Tables 14, 15,
and 16 for decision makers x, y, and z, respectively. The
final recommendation for their consensus is presented in
Table 17. Figure 15 presents this compromise in Venn diagram
form.
While the main features of the procedure have already
been presented, and therefore will not be repeated here,
some points concerning the cardinal-weights case should be
examined. From the tables, we can see that the projects in
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Table 14
TOP NINE PROJECTS UNDER (50, 20, 15, 10, 5)
Cardinal Weights
Cardinal
We ights
5
4
31
13
6
14
27
22
Average utility scores for each criterion,
Recommendeda
16
5
4
13
31
6
14
22
27
Uj (xi,j)b
Rul e ul u2 u3 u4 u5
Equal weights 2 -11 31 19 22
Mode-ordinal 25 - 3 9 5 5
Cardinal weights 25 - 3 9 5 5
Recommended 25 - 3 9 5 5
aRecommended rank is based on order in which projects
appear in cardinal-weights list and at least one other
decision-rule list.
bUtility scores represent increments over the average
utility over all projects for each criterion.
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Rank
Equal
Weights
14
13
22
16
15
24
8
2
28
Mode
Ordinal
5
16
4
6
31
13
22
27
14
- - - -
Table 15
TOP NINE
Equal
Weights
PROJECTS UNDER (22, 21,
Cardinal Weights
Mode
Ordinal
Cardinal
Weights
20, 19, 18)
Recommendeda
5
16
22
15
13
22
28 28
Average utility scores
Rul e
for each criterion, u i
u2 U3
Equal weights
Mode-ordinal
Cardinal weights
Recommended
2 -11
25 - 3
5 - 7
5 - 7
19 22
29 14 21
29 14 21
aRecommended rank is based on order in which projects
appear in cardinal-weights list and at least one other
decision-rule list.
bUtility scores represent increments over the average
utility score over all projects for each criterion.
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Rank
(xi,j)b
- --
Table 16
TOP NINE PROJECTS UNDER (90,
Cardinal Weights
4, 3, 2, 1)
Mode Cardinal
Ordinal Weights Recommendeda
4
16
31
27
24
17
9 28 14 24 13
10 31 8 21
11 27 17 13
Average utility scores for each criterion, ui (xi ,j)b
Rule ul u2 u3 u4 u5
Equal weights 2 -11 31 19 22
Mode-ordinal 25 - 3 9 5 5
Cardinal weights 34 -17 - 9 - 2 3
Recommended 31 -13 - 5 0 6
aRecommended rank is based on order in which projects
appear in cardinal-weights list and at least one other
decision-rule list.
bUtility scores represent increments over the average
utility score over all projects for each criterion.
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Rank
Equal
Weights
13
22
16
24
Table 17
TOP NINE PROJECTS UNDER ALL CARDINAL PREFERENCES
Recommended Rank for Cardinal Preferences Final
20, 15, 10, 5) (22, 21, 20, 19, 18) (90, 4, 3, 2, 1) Recommendeda
22
Average Utility Scores for Each Criterion, ui (xi,j)b
Cardinal Weights u2 u3 u4 u5
(50, 20, 15, 10, 5) 25 -3 9 5 5
(22, 21, 20, 19, 18) 5 -7 29 14 21
(90, 4, 3, 2, 1) 31 -13 -5 0 6
Final Reccgmended 24 -6 8 4 12
aRecommended rank is based on order in which projects appear in at least
two recommendation lists.
bTtility scores represent increments over the average utility score over
all projects for each criterion.
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Rank (50,
-- w
Figure 15
Compromise Among Top Nine Recommended Cardinal Preference Rankings
10,5)
Z
4,3,2,1)
(22, 21
NOTE: Underlined (.) projects are not in the final nine
recommended projects.
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the recommended list are the same as those in the cardinal-
weights ranking using the decision makers' original prefer-
ences, although the orders are slightly perturbed. The
only exception is Project 23 for decision maker z, who
provided an "extreme " preference function. The procedure
recommended replacement of this project with Project 13,
which has superior performance in all but the first
criterion. That is, the procedure acts to suppress the
skewed effects of an extreme cardinal specification. How-
ever, the decision maker may still choose whichever ranking
he judges most consistent with his own preferences.
The method presented for assisting the decision maker in
making and evaluating choices is not dependent on a con-
sensus on the order of the criteria. However, as is easily
anticipated, reaching the final compromise will in such
cases be much more difficult.
Finally, it may be useful to state the "recommended"
ranking procedure in a more formal fashion. If the projects
are being considered under k possible decision rules, the
following information is needed:
Rk,j - the lowest rank* achieved by the jth project
under any decision rule
Rk-l,j - the second lowest rank for the jth project
*Here high ranks denote good projects, with the highest rank
being 1.
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Tj - the sum of the highest k-i ranks for the jth
project:
k-i
I Ri,j
i=l
The recommended ranking is then as follows:
RANKrecommended(Pj) = RANK (Rk-l,j)
That is, the projects are ranked according to their
second-worst performance considering all of the decision-
rules. If two or more projects are tied under this scheme,
the precedence is determined by the total of all but their
worst ranks:
if RANK (Pi) = RANK (Pj) for some i,j,
RANK (Pi) > RANK (Pj) if Ti < Tj
If the projects are still tied after this operation, the
worst performances are taken into account:
RANK (Pi) > RANK (Pj) if Ti + Rk,i < Tj + Rk,j
If the projects are still tied, it is probably not impor-
tant to distinguish between them.
The above formulation is for the ordinal preference
case. For the cardinal preference situation, projects are
ranked as follows:
cardinal
RANKrecommended (Pj) = RANKc(Pj) if RANKc< RANK*
= RANK*(Pj) if RANKc > RANK*
where RANKc(Pj) is the cardinal weights rank for the
jth project
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RANK*(Pj) is the highest rank attained by the
jth project under any non-cardinal decision rule
In this case, ties are broken by the value of RANKc,
that is the ranking of the projects under the cardinal
weights rule. This scheme places greater emphasis on the
actual cardinal weights articulated by the decision maker
than on the other decision rules.
Again, if RANKc(Pj) = 4 and RANK*(Pj) = 8,
RANKc > RANK*, since 1 is the "highest" project ranking.
These rules are developed in detail in Appendix D.
4.5 Summary
Chapter Four presented a hypothetical case study
requiring analysis of 36 rural road projects in a multi-
objective analysis space where the decision makers were in
agreement as to the evaluation criteria and the relative
position of each criterion with respect to the others. It
was shown that the absence of a common metric, i.e. mone-
tary, was not a constraint to ranking. It was further shown
that ranking could be performed when all criteria were given
equal weight, when they were given known relative weights,
when they were given a preferred order, and when the pre-
ferred order is only partially known. Under the last rule,
two studies were made, the first where one criterion was
more important than the other four, amongst which the
decision makers were indifferent; and a second case where
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two criteria, between which the decision makers were indif-
ferent, were more important than the other three, amongst
which there was indifference.
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Chapter Five
APPLICATION OF THE METHODOLOGY WHERE NO CONSENSUS EXISTS
The previous chapter discussed analysis where consensus
exists among decision makers. This chapter will present the
more difficult problem of applying a technique from Chapter
3 for situations where consensus among decision makers
cannot be reached, or where the decision rules are not
disclosed. As in the previous chapter, a case study is
hypotheticized and analyzed. The technique employed is
based on a system of tables and graphs which are then
analyzed iteratively with the decision makers until a
compromise is reached.
5.1 The Scenario
The President of the country of Tap has decided to
invest in pure rural development. He does not demand that
the stream of monetary benefits exceed the costs, in fact he
is not interested in the monetary benefit stream at all. He
wants to gamble on the idea that lack of access is the
controlling factor constraining rural citizens from joining
the cash economy. A budget of four million tapas
(T 4,000,000) has been established for this program.
In explaining the rural roads program to the Minister of
Works, the President cites the following national policies:
- balancing public works investment in the three
regions of the country: x,y, and z
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- increased agricultural output
- improved primary health services; and
- increasing non-agricultural employment
opportunities
He states to the Minister that it is on these factors
that the selection should be made, without regard to the
normal monetized benefit to cost comparisons.
On his return to the Ministry of Works, the Minister
calls in the Director of Planning and explains the situation
to her. Together they work out the following guidelines for
the analyses.
a. Each of the ten states will have one project to be
evaluated, each project should be from the most
rural area of the state
b. No project should exceed T 1.0 Million to simplify
the regional investment balancing issue; and each
region must get one project
c. No project should be less than 30 kilometers to
ensure the chosen projects would have good
political visibility
d. Because production and yield statistics are
unreliable, increased agricultural output would be
estimated using hectares of arable land within ten
kilometers of the road which are not now being
farmed
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e. Improved health care would be estimated using
access time reductions for the average person in
the area
f. For employment generation, only the worker demand
generated by the road would be considered
His parting remark to the Director was, "Now remember,
we won't be able to build one in each state so make sure you
give me enough information to formulate a recommendation the
politicians can accept".
5.2 Development of the Program Objectives
From past experience, the Director had learned a basic
flaw in the definition of all objective functions con-
structed to support multi-objective analysis--the population
bias. Variables tended to be set in terms of total
population served, total income generated, total people with
new access to water, electricity, banking facilities, or a
mid-wife. This bias defeated the objective of moving away
from urban project evaluation tools towards a methodology
which favors rural development. Urban projects dominate
investment allocations because of high population
concentrations. If the rural analysis objective functions
are tied to population they will also favor investment in
the most urbanized parts of the rural areas.
5.3 The Project Set - Cost and Length
After considerable research the Director of Planning
came up with the ten projects in Table 18. Each project is
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Table 18
PROJECTS FOR EVALUATION UNDER THE RURAL ROADS PROGRAM of TAP
Project Name
AX
BX
CX
State Region
Regions x Subtotals
EY
GY
Regions Y Subtotals
Length
35
31
42
113
30
35
32
38
135
HZ
JZ
47
66
35
Estimated Cost*
(T 000's)
735
651
882
2373
730
910
832
988
3510
705
990
525
Regions Z Subtotals
TOTAL KILOMETERS
TOTAL ESTIMATED COST
*Cost per kilometer were estimated at:
Region X = T 21,000
Region Y = T 26,000
Region Z = T 15,000
T 8,103,000
per kilometer
per kilometer
per kilometer
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148 2220
396
identified by the state name (A through K) and the region
name (x,y, or z). The total cost of the ten proposed roads
is double the budget available. (For argument sake we assume
the projects are not amenable to being built shorter, i.e.
are not divisible.)
The next step is to combine projects into strategies
(Table 19) which satisfy a series of preliminary criteria
within the budget constraint and with at least one project
per region:
a. Maximize length
b. Maximize projects
c. Best distribution of length
d. Best distribution of investment
The best solution strategy for maximum length is
unacceptable because it exceeds the budget constraint.
Substituting AX for GY satisfies the budget constraint, but
fails because the strategy excludes Region Y. Therefore, FY
must be taken to make strategy ST-l, which is given in Table
19 (A).
There are no 6 projects which meet the budget con-
straint, so criterion b cannot be met.
To examine the best distribution of lengths, it is nec-
essary to solve for the nominal length per region:
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Table 19
STRATEGY DEFINITION USING THE BUDGET CONSTRAINT
PLUS ONE OTHER CRITERION
A. Maximum Length
Length
CX
FY
HZ
JZ
KZ
42
32
47
66
35
222
Cost
882
832
705
990
525
3934
(ST-1)
B. Best Distribution of Length and of Investment
(1) CX
FY
GY
HZ
KZ
(2) AX
BX
GY
JZ
KZ
(3) AX
BX
DY
FY
JZ
42
32
38
47
35
194
882
832
988
705
525
3932
735
651988
990
525
1820
1230
1386
1515
(ST-4)
(ST-5)3531
38
66
35
66
101
205 3889
35
31
30
32
66
66
62
735
651
870
832
990
1386
1612
194
(ST-2)
3988
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Budget = MXCX + MYCy + MZCz (5-1)
where Budget = 4,000,000
M = Kilometerage in the region
C = Cost per kilometer in the region
If MX = MY = MZ, then
Budget = M (Cx + Cy + Cz )  (5-2)
Solving for M, average length per region,
M = 64.51 kilometers per region
The following set satisfies this criterion quite well:
AX 35 735
> 66
BY 31 651
DY 30 780
> 62
FY 32 832 (ST-2)
JZ 66 990
194 3988
If a weighting by state (3-4-3) is required, then the
kilometers per state would be 18.87, and the regional goals
would be:
X = 56.6
Y = 75.5
Z = 56.6
The following strategy attempts this distribution but
doesn't come as close as did ST-2 to the regional goal.
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AX 35 735
> 66
BX 31 651
EY 35 910 (ST-3)
> 73
GY 38 988
HZ 47 705
186 3989
This strategy appears inferior to ST-2 in that for
essentially the same cost it generates 8 kilometers less
road and a seemingly less equitable distribution regionally.
Admittedly, unlike ST-2, no one state will get twice the
road length of another, or even equal to or more than any
two other states combined.
Best Distribution of Investment
1. Even distribution of investment would put
approximately T 1,333,333 in each region. The nearest
solution to this using the regional unit rates is X = 63,
Y = 51, Z = 89.
AX 35 735
> 66 > 1386
BX 31 651
GY 38 988
HZ 47 705
> 82 > 1230
KZ 35 525
186 3594
More of the budget could be utilized by using any of the
strategies in Table 19 (B). However, none of these
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four strategies is quite satisfactory in achieving a good
distribution of investment.
2. Even distribution of investment could also be
interpreted as equal weight per state, in which case the
regional goals would be:
Region Z T 1,200,000 or 57 km
Region Y T 1,600,000 or 62 km
Region Z T 1,200,000 or 80 km
The best solution here is ST-4 which is an optimization
of the following set:
CX 42 882
DY 30 780
FY 32 > 62 832 > 1612
HZ 47 705
KZ 35 > 82 525 > 1230
186 3724
5.4 The Project Set - Arable Land Available
The Director then collected the data in Table 20
concerning the area of influence, current development, and
development potential. The available arable land ranges from
18,000 hectares for project DY, to 95,040 for project JZ.
The average per project is 39,000 hectares; the average per
region is 130,000. Using the same preliminary criteria to
evaluate this objective as were used in 5.2.1, yields the
sets in Table 21.
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Table 20
RAW AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL BY PROJECT (HECTARES)
Zone of
Influ-
encel
(Hectares)(000)
70
62
84
60
70
64
76
94
132
70
Cultiva-
tion of
Current2
(%)
43%
48%
36%
50%
43%
47%
39%
32
23%
43%
Land
Poten-
tial
(%)
90%
90%
90%
80%
80%
80%
80%
95%
95%
95%
Available
Land
(Ha)
(000)
33
26
45
18
25
21
31
59
95
36
Calculated as 10 kilometers either side of the road
Calculated as an area of 20 kms x 10 kms along the
connecting road plus pockets of subsistive farm-
ing, i.e. about 30,000 Ha.
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Project
Name
AX
BX
CX
DY
EY
FY
GY
HZ
JZ
KZ
Length
of Road
(Km)
35
31
42
30
35
32
38
47
66
35
Notes
Table 21
STRATEGY DEFINITION FOR AGRICULTURE USING
BUDGET CONSTRAINT AND ONE OTHER CRITERION
A. Maximize New Hectarage
Project New Hectarage
(000)
95
59
45
21
256
Road Cost(000)
990
705
880
525
832
3934
B. Best Distribution of Arable Land
- Regional Basis
33
26
26
31
59
- State Basis
175
735
651
910
988
705
3989
AX
DY
EY
FY
HZ
33
> 65
59
157
735
780
910
832
705
3962
C. Distribution by Investment
Project Land
AX 33
BX 26 > 59
DY 18
> 39FY 21
95
193
CY
DY
EY
FY
KZ
18
26
21
45 882
780
65 910
832
36 525
146 3929
Balance Criterion
Cost
735
651 > 1386651
780
> 1612832
990
(ST-2)
3988
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CX
FY
(ST-1)
AX
BX
EY
GY
(ST-3)
---
Arable land available is so closely correlated to road
length that the same strategy, ST-1, satisfies the maximum
hectarage criterion as satisfied the maximum length
criterion.
To determine the best distribution of new arable land by
region, DR, solve:
DR = Budget Xi) R-1 (5-3)
\Total Cost i=l /
where, X is the objective value
P is the member of projects
R is the number of regions
i is the specific project
DR = 64.17
The solution is strategy ST-3, the same strategy which
satisfied the length distribution criterion for the state
based distribution. For the state based distribution on the
land objective, substitute S for R in Equation 5-3, where S
is the number of states. This gives as the distribution
goals:
Region X = 57.76
Region Y = 77.01
Region Z = 57.76
The criterion would be well met if project DY or FY
could be added to ST-3 without exceeding the budget
constraint. Alternately, strategies using the lowest three
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projects from Region Y and one each from X and Z were
developed. These appear in Table 21(B). Neither strategy
seems competitive to ST-2.
The equal investment criterion used in 5.2.1 is used for
this objective as well, while trying to maximize and
equalize distribution of arable land. Strategy ST-2, the
preferred strategy for the length objective, appears to be
the best choice for this criterion.
5.5 The Project Set - Health Care Access
The decision to use basic health care access reflects
the Director's readings in the World Bank's Health Sector
Policy Paper. (18)
"It is estimated that cholera patients who arrive at
a hospital within three hours of the onset of
symptoms run no risk of death; that those who
arrive after 3 to 6 hours have a 10% fatality rate;
and that after 6 hours the fatality rate is 30%."
A metric for health access was proposed which reflected
this concept of access time to a medical facility. A
reduction in access time from over 6 hours to 3 to 6, and
from 3 to 6 to less than 3 hours represents potential lives
saved. In the former case 20 lives are saved per 100 and in
the latter, 10 lives per 100. To remove the population bias,
the potential lives saved will be normalized by the total
population served. Obviously cholera is not the only disease
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in rural Tap, it doesn't strike everyone, and the rural
health units provide services beyond rehydration; neverthe-
less this system is a meaningful proxy for the benefits of
improved access to primary health services. Table 22 pres-
ents the relevant data by population.
(The low population figures in all the project zones
raise another interesting issue. Examining project EY shows
a population density of about 100 people per kilometer of
new road. The large increase in arable land (Table 20) will
require a large influx of new farmers to make the land
productive. This could form the basis for another objective,
if resettlement is an important goal.)
Table 23 shows the standardization of the reduction in
fatality measure for population, i.e. reduction per 1000
inhabitants, based on the previously stated guidelines. The
preliminary evaluation of this objective is presented as
Table 24. The health maximization strategy ST-6 should have
included project DY but for the budget constraint.
After the best four projects, sufficient funds were only
available for Project KZ. No other combination of projects
provides a higher health access score within the budget.
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Table 22
HEALTH ACCESS IMPROVEMENT DATA (POPULATION 000's)
Total POPULATION GROUPED BY ACCESS TIME
Popula- 0 - 3 Hours
tion without
3 - 6 Hours
with without
Over 6 Hours
with without with
1.8 0.2
1.8 0.1
3.4 1.2
2.7 0.5
2.4 0.8
1.2 0.0
2.5 0.0
2.2 0.6
1.1 0.0
2.7 0.9
Road
Project
AX 3.6
2.2
4.3CX
EY
FY
GY
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.3
2.8
2.1
1.1
1.4
2.4
1.6
2.2
0.4
1.1
1.9
1.5
0.3
0.8
0.5
0.7
0.5
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.9
3.4
3.5
1.8
2.7
2.3
1.1
3.9
0.6
0.0
2.0
1.5
0.3
0.2
0.5
1.3
0.0
1.1
128
Table 23
CONVERSION OF HEALTH ACCESS PROXY TO
HEALTH ACCESS BENEFIT MEASURE
REDUCED
FATALITIES
570(2)
540
540
560
520
390
720
350
330
520
TOTAL
POPULATION
3600
2200
4300
3400
3500
1800
2700
2300
1100
3900
HEALTH ACCESS
BENEFIT MEASURE(1)
158
245
126
165
149
217
267
152
300
.133
(1) This Is The Ratio Of The Reduced Fatalities To
Population Expressed As A Scalar
(2) Sample Calculation for Project AX:
WITHOUT WITH
1800 x 30% = 540
1500 x 10% = 150
690
200 x 30% = 60
600 x 10% = 60
120 = 570 saved
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PROJECT
NAME
AX
BX
CX
DY
EY
GY
HZ
Table 24
STRATEGY DEFINITION FOR HEALTH ACCESS
WITH A BUDGET CONSTRAINT
A. Maximize Health Access Improvement With Budget
Project
Name
JZ
GY
BX
Health
Access
Score
300
267
245
217
133
1162
Project
Cost
900
988
651
832
525
3986
B. Equal Distribution of Health Access
Project
Name
Health
Access
Improvement
Project
Cost
158 > 403
245
165 > 382
217
300 300
1085
130
(ST-6)
735
651
780
832
(ST-2)
990
3988
--
Equal Distribution
Using the equation at 5-3 and a substitute objective
yields a regional distribution guide of 314.62 and, on a
state weight basis, a regional guide of:
X = 283
Y = 378
Z = 283
Strategy ST-2, shown in Table 24B, appears to satisfy both
guidelines.
Balanced Investment
Strategy ST-2 has been shown previously to satisfy this
criterion on both a regional and on a state weighted basis.
5.6 The Project Set - Incremental Employment
The road investment will require unskilled construction
labor from the area. This is a benefit to the area and to
the state. The data confirm there is surplus labor available
in each project area hence no farm labor will be diverted to
the detriment of the agricultural production capacity. The
local government authority will also assume responsibility
for maintaining the road for 10 years using special funds
earmarked for the purpose. The following rules were estab-
lished to estimate the employment impact:
- Construction will procede at 25 kilometers per
year, and will require 40 unskilled local workers
per year plus 10 unskilled workers per each
T 100,000 of value
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- Maintenance productivity will be 15 kilometers per
worker per year over the 10 years of the project
life
Table 25 summarizes the employment impact of each
project being considered. As with the other objectives, a
preliminary review was performed to identify strategies
which maximized employment within the budget constraint,
gave the best distribution of new employment, and gave the
best distribution of investment while maximizing for employ-
ment. The results of this are presented as Table 26.
Maximizing for labor we find that the top 4 projects (J,
G, C, H) do not permit a fifth project within the budget
constraint. As for the length and arable land objectives, FY
substituted for GY to permit KZ and making the maximized
stategy ST-1.
The best distribution of employment benefits is
calculated as in 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 using Equation 5-3. For the
region based guideline, use 277.43, and for the state
weighted guideline use:
X = 249.69
Y = 332.92
Z = 249.69
Strategy ST-2 best satisfies this criterion. It also
best satisfies the equal investment criterion for both the
regional and state-weighted guidelines.
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Table 25
LOCAL EMPLOYMENT IMPACT DATA
Project
Cost
735
651
882
780
910
832
988
705
990
525
Labor
Needl
73.5
65.1
88.2
78.0
91.0
83.2
98.8
70.5
99.0
52.5
(Man-Years)
Project Labor
Length Needed 2
35 56.0
31 49.6
42 67.2
30 48.0
35 56.0
32 51.2
38 60.8
47 75.2
66 105.6
35 56.0
Mainte-
nance
Labor 3
23.3
20.7
28.0
20.0
23.3
21.3
25.3
31.3
44.0
23.3
Total
Labor4
153
135
183
146
170
156
185
177
249
132
lat 10 man-years per T 100,000.
2 at 40 man-years per year of construction at 25 kilometers
per year constructed.
3 at 0.67 man-years per kilometer for the full 10 years period.
4 totalled and rounded.
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Project
Name
AX
BX
CX
DY
EY
FY
GY
HZ
JZ
Table 26
STRATEGY DEFINITION USING THE NEW EMPLOYMENT
OBJECTIVE WITH A BUDGET CONSTRAINT
A. Maximize For New Employment
Project
Name
JZ
FY
CX
HZ
KZ
Labor
Needed
249
156
183
177
132
897
Project
Cost
990
832
882
705
525
3934
B. Best Distribution And Even Investment
Project Name
AX
BX
DY
FY
JZ
(ST-2)
> 1386
> 1612
990
3988
(ST-1 )
CostLabor
153
135
146
156
> 288
735
651
780
832
> 302
249
839
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A. Maximize For New Employment
5.7 The Project Set - Evaluation
5.7.1 Evaluation of Multiple Objectives
The project objectives and data set have been defined
and a series of strategies identified. There are four
objectives:
L - Length of the route (kilometers)
A - New Arable land (hectares)
H - Improved Health access (persons per 1000)
E - Incremental employment (man years of labor)
There are two constraints:
a. - the budget of T4 million
b. - each region must have at least one project
There are ten projects, one from each state (Table 27).
Of the nearly 8000 combinations (5 at a time) which can be
made from these 10 projects, there are 1944 combinations
which meet constraint b and of these, not more than 108
combinations meet the budget constraint. These combinations
were subjected to a preliminary evaluation using three
criteria:
MAX - maximize the objective
DIST - equal distribution of the objective
INV - balance investment while achieving equal
distribution
A fourth criterion, maximize projects was dropped
because no 6 project strategy was possible given the budget
135
Table 27
SUMMARY OF PROJECT SCORES BY OBJECTIVE
Available
Arable
Land
33
26
45
18
26
Health Access
Improvement
Score
158
245
126
165
149
Proj.
Length
35
31
42
30
35
32
38
47
66
35
Employment
Impact
153
135
183
146
170
156
185
177
249
132
136
Proj.
Name
AX
BX
CX
D Y
E Y
F Y
G Y
H Z
J Z
K Z
Project
Cost
735
651
882
780
910
832
988
705
990
525
217
267
152
300
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constraint. Also, the distribution and investment criteria
appeared frequently to be satisfied by the same strategy.
The six strategies which most frequently surfaced are
shown in Table 28.
5.7.2 Presentation Of Multiple Objective Analysis
No specific interobjective weighting, cardinal or
ordinal, was given the Director. Furthermore many decision
makers will be involved in the final resolution. As no
consensus seems to exist, nothing can be aggregated further,
nor is ranking feasible. The analysis will be presented
graphically.
A presentation for the impact on each state by strategy
by objective is possible; however, five states must be
disappointed with each strategy and several states are only
in one or two strategies. There is little to be gained by
this presentation.
Similarly, there is nothing to be gained by presenting
impact by region by strategy by objective. The bias is
clear. Region X observes that ST-2, ST-3, and ST-5 are
identical and rejects the other three. Region Y rejects
ST-l, ST-2, and ST-5 as inferior; sees ST-4 and ST-6 as
identical and has a minor tradeoff of investment against
health between them and ST-3. Region Z has no choice but to
move for ST-1 as it includes all their projects while
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Table 28
SUMMARY OF STRATEGIES
PROJECTS COST LENGTH AVAILABLE HEALTH EMPLOYMENT
STRATEGY ARABLE ACCESS REMAR KS
LAND IMPROVEMENT(P) (C) (L) (A) (H) (E)
X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z
MAX L, A, E
ST-1 C F HFK 882 832 2220 42 32 148 45 21 190 126 217 585 183 156 558
3934 222 256 928 897
DISTR L,H,E
ST-2 AB DF J 1386 1612 990 66 62 66 59 39 95 403 382 300 288 302 249 INVR C,L,A,H
3988 194 193 1085 839 INVS s C,L,A,H
DIST s A,H,E
ST-3 AB EG H 1386 1898 705 66 73 47 59 57 59 403 416 152 288 355 177 DIST s L
3989 186 175 971 820 DIST R A
ST-4 C FG HK 882 1820 1230 42 70 82 45 52 95 126 484 285 183 341 309 DISTR L
3982 194 192 895 833 INVs L
ST-5 AB G JK 1386 988 1515 66 38 101 59 31 131 403 267 433 288 185 381 INVRC
3889 205 221 1103 854
ST-6 B FG JK 651 1820 1515 31 70 101 26 52 131 245 484 433 135 341 381 MAX H
3986 202 029 1162 857
returning the maximum for 3 out of 4 objectives to the
nation. In fact only Region Y is faced with any choice at
all.
One useful presentation is strategy by objectives. One
problem with this presentation could be there are four
objectives and only three dimensions. The first step would
be to prepare the 4 plots showing 3 objectives at a time:
LAH - LENGTH - ARABLE LAND - HEALTH (Figure 16)
LAE - LENGTH - ARABLE LAND - EMPLOMENT (Figure 17)
LHE - LENGTH - HEALTH - EMPLOYMENT (Figure 18)
AHE - ARABLE LAND - HEALTH - EMPLOYMENT (Figure 19)
Reviewing these four graphs we note that ST-2, ST-3, and
ST-4 are always fully interior, i.e. they are never superior
to any other strategy. Except for the LAE graph (Figure 17)
where ST-1 contains all the other strategies, ST-5 and ST-6
are viable solutions. The explanation for this is that we
are only viewing graphs with a national bias. The interior
strategies were selected during the preliminary inspection
(Chapter 5.2) because they provided a measure of regional
distribution for each objective. They also provide a degree
of investment balance, the third criterion used in the
preliminary inspection. This is not to say that Figures 16
through 19 are useless, but only that they mask the distri-
bution criterion.
Figures 20 through 23 display the regional disaggrega-
tion of the six strategies one objective at a time. Figure
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Figure 16
STRATEGY BY OBJECTIVES (LENGTH-ARABLE LAND-HEALTH ACCESS)
LAND
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LENGTH
Figure 17
STRATEGY BY OBJECTIVES (LENGTH-ARABLE LAND-EMPLOYMENT)
141
ARABLE L
GTH
Figure 18
STRATEGY BY OBJECTIVES (LENGTH-HEALTH ACCESS-EMPLOYMENT)
HEAL
TH
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Figure 19
STRATEGY BY OBJECTIVES (ARABLE LAND-HEALTH ACCESS-EMPLOYMENT)
HEALTH
143
ARABLE
LAND
Figure 20
LENGTH OBJECTIVE BY REGION - ALL STRATEGIES WITH GUIDELINE CRITERIA
CRITERIA
COORDINATES
X Y
DS 57 76
IR- 63 51
IS= 57 62
1 STRATEGY NUMBER
D EVEN DISTRIBUTION
I EVEN INVESTMENT
R REGIONAL WEIGHTING
S STATE WEIGHTING
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x
Figure 21
NEW ARABLE LAND OBJECTIVE BY REGION - ALL STRATEGIES WITH GUIDELINE CRITERIA
CRITERIA
COORDINATES
X Y Z
DR: 64 64 64
DS-- 58 77 58
1 STRATEGY NUMBER
D EVEN DISTRIBUTION
R REGIONAL WEIGHTING
S STATE WEIGHTING
145
Figure 22
HEALTH ACCESS OBJECTIVE BY REGION - ALL STRATEGIES WITH GUIDELINE CRITERIA
2
CRITERIA
COORDINATES
X Y
DS- 315 315
IR= 283 378
Z
315
283
1 STRATEGY NUMBER
D EVEN DISTRIBUTION
R REGIONAL WEIGHTING
S STATE WEIGHTING
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Figure 23
EMPLOYMENT IMPACT OBJECTIVE BY REGION - ALL STRATEGIES WITH GUIDELINE CRITERIA
DR- 277 277 277
DS- 250 333 250
GY NUMBER
STRIBUTION
R REGIONAL WEIGHTING
S STATE WEIGHTING
147
20 shows the location in the three dimension space of each
of the even distribution and even investment criteria using
both regional and state weighting. The remaining figures
only show the two even distribution criteria as the even
investment criteria is within a few percent and does not
change the location materially.
The first interesting observation regarding the
regionally disaggregated figures is the contrast with the
aggregated ones. Whereas in the latter a minimum of 3
strategies were always interior, in this case none is
interior. In fact only in the case of the health objective
(Figure 22) is there an instance of one strategy lying on
the face of another. Clearly strategies ST-2, ST-3, and ST-4
are quite relevant to the issue of regional balance.
This conclusion is supported by the observation that
these three strategies seem normally to lie more proximate
to the even distribution guideline criteria corners. Of the
three strategies, ST-2 and ST-3 seem to more closely satisfy
the distribution criteria.
5.8 Final Recommendation to the Decision Makers
There is no reason to expect any conclusion, ranking, or
final recommendation to result from this analyses. The
purpose is solely to simplify the presentation of voluminous
information to decision makers where no consensus exists.
The best guidance the Director of Planning could give the
Minister of Works would be:
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o If maximization is important, select ST-i, unless health
access improvement is more significant than the other
objectives. If so, then chose ST-5 or ST-6 depending
upon the extent it is more significant.
o If regional balance is more important than total
national maximization then select ST-2 or ST-3 depending
upon the trade-offs desired. If the intention is to
favor Region Y, then select ST-3, unless health is very
much more important, in which case ST-6 to favor Region
Z, ST-4 for X.
o The best for Region Z is ST-i. Region X is indifferent
to ST-2, ST-3, or ST-5. ST-3 favors Y, ST-5 favors Z,
and ST-2 is intermediate but slightly towards Y.
5.9 Summary
Chapter Five presented a hypothetical case study
requiring analysis of ten rural road projects in a multiple-
objective analysis space where no decision rules were
disclosed and no decision maker consensus existed. It was
shown that without rules, consensus, and a common metric for
aggregation, it was not possible to rank the projects defin-
itively. However, using a series of policy objectives, it
was possible to preprocess the information for presentation
in tables or graphs to the decision makers for discussion.
As preferences or perspectives became clearer, the presen-
tation could be modified to emphasize or delete certain
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aspects. On this iterative basis, a set of tables and
graphs which supported various positions was produced to aid
the decision makers.
Moreover, it was concluded that in this situation
attempts to rank or compel consensus were inappropriate.
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Chapter Six
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the preceding chapters the idea of multi-objective
analysis was introduced in the context of rural road devel-
opment. The need resulted from the inability of tradi-
tional economic efficiency criteria to handle the problem
adequately.
In Chapter Two the range of possible objectives was
discussed non-exhaustively. These included national and
regional income, agricultural surplus, health, labor, and
education. It was shown that no reasonable metric existed
which could permit aggregation. Without aggregation a
single objective utility function could not be defined,
therefore the analysis required multiple utility functions.
The techniques for multi-objective evaluation were presented
in Chapter Three.
The issue of techniques for multi-objective evaluation
was broken into two general classes. These two techniques
were not redundant. One was appropriate for multiple
objectives of independant metrics where the interrelation
was known, i.e. there was consensus among the decision
makers. Techniques were presented for defining the con-
sensus (equal weights, cardinal, ordinal and partial
ordinal) and producing a ranking. If any measure can be
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developed to interrelate the various objectives, then this
technique should be investigated. Chapter Four presented a
hypothetical case study of 36 projects and 5 criteria. Each
procedure was applied systematically to show that ranking
could be achieved so long as a cardinal or ordinal relation-
ship could be defined that represented the decision maker
consensus.
The second technique presented in Chapter Three was appro-
priate to the context of no consensus or undisclosed
decision rules. This is often the case where the decision
maker/technician dialogue is poor, e.g. where decisions are
on highly political, non-technical, policy objectives. In
the event no consensus exists, then a general technique for
data organization, manipulation, and presentation is
offered. This technique does not attempt to reach conclu-
sions; for to do so presumes consensus can be compelled. It
is strongly suggested that more extensive use of "no consen-
sus" techniques be encouraged in difficult program evalua-
tion. It will either be helpful directly to the decision
makers, or force them to some degree of consensus.
The no consensus techniques were then applied to the
hypothetical case study in Chapter Five. This case study,
comprising 10 projects and 5 objectives, sought to achieve
an overall strategy of investment which would address a
series of policy objectives. These objectives could not be
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translated into discrete utility functions. A system of
graphs and tables was developed which could aid the decision
makers in reviewing the implications of various decisions
without compelling a consensus or proposing a definitive
ranking.
Optimum rural road investment decisions are normally
quite difficult to achieve. Use of multiple objective
techniques by technicians as part of an iterative evaluation
process with decision makers can be productive in defining
objectives and developing strategies for investment. Use of
the techniques presented above is encouraged where
appropriate.
Additional research into rural road investment and the
definition of key variables and indicators will be helpful;
however, political considerations will always require the
analysis to be performed in a multiple objective context.
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APPENDIX A. LINEAR PROGRAMMING ORDINAL RULES
A.1 Pure Ordinal Preference
To begin, let us state the following:
a) The number of independent criteria under consideration
total n.
b) The weights, w., corresponding to each criteria are
not specified, but the order of their preference is
specified. They are ranked as follows:
w1 > w2  > . . . . . . . . => w
c) The weights are normalized and non-negative:
n
E w. = 1.0
i=l1
wi  > 0 (i = 1, 2 . . . n)
For each project, let us determine the maximum and minimum total
scores given any set of cardinal weights which obeys the stated
ordinal preferences of the decision maker; we call them Sm ax and
Sm i n , respectively, for the jth project.
One way of formalizing this is to treat it as two linear program-
ming problems, as follows:
Maximize (Minimize) Si =
Subject to:
S- i+1
I W. =
i= i iXi ) (A-l)
(A-2)
( = i, 2....... , n-1) (A-3)
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(i = 1, 2 . . . ., n)
Equation (A-3) reflects the ordering of the criteria, while
Equations (A-2) and (A-4) ensure that the weights are non-
negative and normalized.
By the application of two transformations:
Zi = w i -w.i+
M = l uk (Xk,j)
(i = 1, 2, . . .
(i = 1, 2,
the above formulation can be simplified to:
n
Maximize (Minimize) S. = E M. . Z.
3 i=l 1 j 1
subject to: E iZ. =
i=l
Z. > 01- (i = 1, 2, ..... n-l)
The problem has now been transformed to a form whereby there is
only one functional constraint. The optimal solution to a linear
programming problem of this form will have only one of the func-
tional variables Zi positive with all other functional variables
equal to zero. Utilizing this it can be observed that Equation
(4-5) becomes:
1Z. = - (A-10)
for some i, since only one variable Z. will be non-zero. The
important result that follows is that S. will be maximizedJ
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, n-l) (A-5)
S a ., n) (A-6)
(A-7)
(A-8)
(A-9)
wi > 0 (A-4)
(minimized) according to whether - Mij is maximized (minimized).
The process is thus reducel to the identification of the maximum
(minimum) value from all -- Mi j from Equation (A-6):
S1i 1M. .= E Uk(xkj)1 1, k=li 1,j (i = 1, 2, ....... , n) (A-11)
From the above, we can see that the linear programming formula-
tion produces n sets of cardinal weights, as follows:
o ...... O
0 ...... O
1/3 ...... 0O 1
k (A-12)
........................... O for i > k
1/n ...... 1/n
one of which will produce the maximum total score for any given
project and one which will produce the minimum. The set of weights
maximizing (minimizing) one project will, however, not be the
same as that maximizing (minimizing) another.
The max-ordinal rule is then found from Equations (A-1) and
(A-12) as:
maxS Max[Sk] = w.k u. (x. )
k ' .k i=
(A-13)
and the min-ordinal rule as:
Sn = MiniS ] = w. u (xi )
k jk i=1 ,k i i,j (A-14)
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k\i
wi ki,k
1
1/2
1/3
0
1/2
1/3
1/n 1/n
__ _
TV% M %?
rn w I
The projects are then ranked according to the value of Smax
or Sm in , respectively, for the two decision rules. )
A.2 Partial Ordinal Preference
Similar to the pure ordinal preference case above, we define the
following conditions:
a) The number of independent criteria under consideration
is n.
b) The weights, w., are not specified, but the partial order
of their preference is specified. They are ranked as
follows:
(wi = w = ... = w (w qr = "' = ) .
> (wt = w ... = wn )
That is, a preferential ordering is given between subsets
of criteria, with criteria within a subset being of
equal weight.
c) The total number of subsets, Tk , is m.
d) The number of criteria in each subset is given by nk.
e) The weights are normalized: n
C w. = 1.
i=l 1
We now define the following linear programming problems:
n
Maximize (minimize) S i=l w. u. (xJ .) (A-15)
i=l1
n
subject to: Z w. = 1
i=1
Wi - wi+ 1 > 0 if i E Tk and i+l . Tk for some k
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wi - Wi+l = 0
wi > 0
if i, i+l e Tk for some k
(i = 1, 2, .... , n)
(A-16)
(A-17)
Equation (A-16) states that weights in the same subset are equal,
while those in different subsets are ordered.
Applying our same two transformations (A-5) and (A-6), we have:
Maximize (Minimize) S = Mi, .j Zi(M1k')z 3. (A-18)
subject to: Si Z. =
i=l
zi > 0
Z. = 03
if i E Tk and i+l ý Tk for some k
if i, i+l E Tk for some k (A-20)k
This is the same formulation as (A-10) above, except for the
restriction that Z. can be non-zero only for i's representing
the last criterion in a subset. Thus, for example, if T includes
the first three criteria, then Z Z = 0 and Z3 = 1/3 since
the 3rd and 4th criteria are in Ai ferent subsets.
We have the following set of k cardinal weights, as follows:
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(A-19)
2 3 ........... n
1/n1  ......... 0
1/(nl+n2 ) 1/(n1 +n2 ) ........ O0
l/(n 1 +n 2 +n 3 ) l/(n 1 +n 2 +n3 )..... O0
1/n 1/n
1
k k
Sn k i< k n
j=1 j=1
k
0 i> E nk
j=1
and Equations (A-13) and (A-14) provide the max- and min-ordinal
decision rules.
A.3 Mixed Cardinal and Ordinal Preference
If the decision maker specifies a mixture of cardinal and ordinal
preferences, providing the ordinal information in (A-3) or the
partial ordinal information in (A-16) plus cardinal weights for
a subset C of the criteria containing m elements, i.e.,
w. = c.i:1
if i E C (A-22)
-then we may use the following linear programming problems to
compute the upper and lower bound project scores:
Maximize (Minimize) S. = E w. u. (x. )
3 i=1
(A-23)
subject to:
w. - wi+> 0
1 i+1
n
7 w = 11
=11
(i = 1, 2, ..... n-i)
W. > 01 -
w. = c.1 1 if i . C
161
Wi,k
(A-24)
(A-25)
(A-26)
(A-27)
I
for the pure ordinal mixed case, with constraint (A-25) replaced
by:
i - i+l
Wi - Wi+l = O
if i e Tk and i+l Tk for some k
if i, i+l s Tk for some k (A-28)
for the partial ordinal mixed case. While these problems can be
reduced to closed form solutions, the algebra is tedious and adds
little to the understanding of the min-ordinal and max-ordinal
decision rules.
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APPENDIX B. THE MODE-ORDINAL RULE
B.1 Pure Ordinal Preference
The mode-ordinal decision rule is based upon determining the
"most-likely" set of cardinal weights obeying a specified
ordinal preference. We define the following:
a) The number of independent criteria under considera-
tion is n;
b) The weights, Wi, corresponding to each criteria are
not specified, but the order of their preference is
as follows:
W1 > W > ... > W
1 2- n
c) The weights are non-negative and normalized
W > 0 (i = 1, 2, ... n)i -
n
E W. = 1
i=l
The "most likely" set of weights is that set which has the
greatest probability of occurrence. In an equivalent formulation,
the most likely first weight, is that which provides maximum
flexibility for the values of the remaining weights. We will
use the latter line of reasoning in this development.
We pose the question, give n ordered criteria, what is the
most-likely value of the weight on the first criteria. Clearly
if n=2, the question has no answer, since all weights of criteria
one greater than or equal to one-half are equally likely. What
if n=3? The most-likely value for W1 is determined from the
following integrals:
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N3 (x > 1/2) = N (x) =
N3 (x < 1/2) = N3 (x) =
l-x y
dy
1-x
2
1-x
2
dy
1-x-y
1-x-y
y is the value of W2
z is the value of W3
and Nn is the "number" of sets of weights having W1 = x
and n criteria
If x > 1/2 the second criterion, y, can range between l-x (all
the remaining weight) or (1-x)/2 (half the remaining weight,
since it cannot be less than the weight on criterion 3). Cri-
terion 3 has a weight between that of criterion 2 and the
remaining unassigned weight, l-x-y. These integrals evaluate
as follows:
+ 1 l-x
N (x)3 2 2
(B-3)
()- 1 3x-l
N3 (x) = ( 2 2
Similar integrals for greater numbers of weights are evaluated
as follows:
+ l-x
N (x) = 3 (4 3
(B-4)
- 3 4x-1N4 (x) - (
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dz (B-l)
dz (B-2)
ww· ~ ~ o A•.-i •, .- ,a i., & vu li V.L .kI1,%. %, ,. · W
N (x)= 32.2 (-x)4
(B-5)
N (x)=2 5x-l 4
5 ( 4
l-x
Nn+ I (x) = [(INn (y ) d y ) * {l-x}] l-x
(B-6)
x
N (x) = [(INn(y)dy) * {l-x})]
n+1 n 1-x
n
k
where * denotes multiplication of each power, y , resulting
from the integration by its binomial counteppart power of
(l-x); i.e., yk (l-x)n-k. That is, for N4 as an example:
(N y ( (1-6y+9y2)N3 (y) 8
1 2 3N3 (y) dy = (y-3y +3y ) (B-7)
(IN3 (y) dy) * l-x} 1 2 2 3
(N (y) dy) {* l-x) } [y(l-x) - 3y2 (l-x) + 3y ] A
+ (l-x
so that N4 (x) =A
l-x
3
1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 3S((l-x) -3(1-x) +3(1-x) )-( (-x) -(l-x) +3 38 8 3 9 2 7(1-x) )
1 3 1 3
= (l-x) - (1(l-x)
(B-8)
1 8 3 1 3
= -.1(1-x) ) = (1-x)
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Similarly for the other values of N.
From Equation (B-6), we can determine the values of N for any
value of n, as follows: n
n-l n-l
N+ () = (n-2) (l-x)
n 22 [(n-1)!] 2  (B-9)
N (x) = (nx-l)n-
n
2[(n-l)!]
From this, it is quite easy to see that the mode, i.e., the
largest value of Nn indicating the greatest number of distributions
having a weight of x on the first criterion, occurs for x=1 for
all n > 2. That is, the most likely weight on the first 2
criterion is
Wmode 1 (B-10)
1 2
The values of N+ and N are shown in Figure B-I for n = 3, 5,
and .o
This result should not be surprising. To grasp it intuitively,
let us investigate the effects of W1 on the range of values left
for the second criterion only. The range of W1 is constrained
between 1 and 1/n if there are n criterion, due to the ordering.
Similarly, the second criterion is constrained between 1/2 and
0 independently of the value of W1. Thus, if W1 > 1/2, the
range of values for W2 has been further constrained; since
W2 < l-W1 < 1/2. Similarly if W1 < 1/2, since then W2 < W1 < 1/2.
Thus, any value for W1 not equal to 1/2 constrains the choices
of the second criterion. This effect "trickles down" through
all subsequent criteria, the extent of the effects being deter-
mined by how much W1 deviates from 1/2 and the number of criteria,
as can be seen from Figure B-1.
Now that we have determined the most likely weight for the
first criterion, we can remove it from our problem. We now have
n-I ordered criteria whose weights must sum to 1/2. Clearly, this
will produce a value of 1/4 for the weight on the second criteria,
and so on.
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Figure B - 1
THE LIKELIHOOD OF VARIOUS WEIGHTS ON THE FIRST CRITERION, W1,
WITH THE MODE ASSIGNED A LIKELIHOOD OF 100,
FOR VARIOUS NUMBERS OF CRITERIA
C.U .2 .4 .6 .8
Weight on First Criterion, W,
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We now have the following cardinal weights as the most-likely
given the ordinal preference:
-i = 2Wi = 2 (B-ll)
These would be normalized if we had an infinite number of
criteria; however, give a finite number of criteria n, the last
two weights, Wn-1 and W are undefined. We have the following
choices to ensure normality:
or
-i/ n -iW =2 E 2
-i=
W. =2
:1
(B-12)
(B-13)
W = W
n n-i
For large number of criteria the two become equivalent; for the
5-criteria case used as a case study, the two sets of weights
would be:
from (B-12) W.
1 n=5
from (B-13) W.
n=5
= (.5161, .2581, .1290, .0645, .0323)
(B-14)
= (.5000, .2500, .1250, .0625, .0625)
We have opted for the latter (B-13) interpretation due to its
simplicity.
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(i = 1, 2, ... , n)
(i = 1, 2, ... , n-1)
B.2 Partial Ordinal Preference
If a partial ordinal preference is specified, in that an order
of preference is given for k subsets {S k } of the criteria within
each of which the nk criteria are of equal importance, we would
produce the most-likely set of weights as follows. Consider
first the first subset {S1} containing n1 criteria. From
Equations (B-3), we would have that the most-likely weight on
'these criteria would be
1 1
x = Max [ 2nl ] (B-15)2n1 , n
This leaves l-nlx1 as the total weight on the remaining criteria.
For the second subset of criteria, we would have:
l-nlxl 1-nlxl
x =Max [ ] (B-16)2 2n , n-n1
subject to x2 < l1
That is,
l-nlx1  l-nlXl
x = Min [x1 , Max [ n -n (B-17)
2 1
For example, if the first subset contains three criteria and
the second only one, xl = 1/6 and x2 = 1/4 > xl so the first
four weights would all be 1/6, if there were a very large number
of criteria.
This leaves 1-nx. - n2x2 as the total weight on the remaining
criteria. For the third subset, we would have:
M-n lx - n 2 x 2  1-n lx1 - n2x 2S= in x ax 2n' (B-18)
23 1-i 2
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and so on. Thus, we would have the following set of most-
likely weights for the partial-ordinal decision rule:
W =Max1
W. = Mini
1 1[ , ]2n n
1- [ n.W. 1- E n.W.
"Wi i'j=3l i3-=l
[W ,Max j=1 , i j=1 ]] (i=2, 3,...k-1)i-1 i-12n.I n- E n.
j=l 
(B-19)( -19)
Wk Wk_k k-1
and W. = W. if i s {S.
It should be noted that this rule is much "weaker" than the
mode-ordinal decision rule, in that it is closer to the equal
weights case. It is not recommended as an evaluation tool.
B.3 Mixed Cardinal and Ordinal Preferences
While this rule could be algebraically developed, it adds little
to the understanding of the approach and is not recommended as
a decision rule. The linear programming approaches are to be
preferred in such cases.
B.4 Mean-Ordinal Rule
A final rule which could be used, but which was not in the
present study, would be the expected cardinal weights given the
ordinal preference. Based upon relations (B-9), this could be
formulated as follows for n criteria:
3
n + n - 2
1 2n(n+l) (n-l)
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i-i 3(n+l-i) + (n-1-i)Wi = (1- E W.) (i=2, 3, ... n-1)
j=1 2 (n+l-i) (n+2-i) (n-i)
n-i
W = 1- E W.
n j=l 3
For the five criteria case, this would yield:
W. = (.533, .2567, .1225, .0583, .0292)1
which is sufficiently close to the mode-ordinal weights that
it was deemed redundant. For very large n, the two become
identical.
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(B-20)
APPENDIX C. DATA FOR THE CASE STUDY*
C.1 A Detailed Description of One Project
In this section a detailed description of one of the
projects, the Makir-Aros feeder road project (Figure C-1),
is presented. A brief description of the overall set of
projects to be ranked and some of the differences among the
projects is given in Section C.2.
The proposed 20 kilometer feeder road project extends
out from a small provincial market town of Makir. The
community of Aros served by the road has suitable conditions
(physical, ecological, demographic, etc.) for agricultural
development. At present a trail (earth road not passable by
motor vehicles) exists which is mainly used for walking or
transport by pack animals to the market town where the
peasants periodically come to sell some of their agricul-
tural surplus or to buy some consumer goods (cloth, spices,
etc.).
As part of a regional development effort, this project
has been identified and a proposed package of investment
projects has been advocated by the design team, consisting
of a gravel road, extension services and help to grow some
*This is a hypothetical case study initiated by Chew in
1977, published in 1979, and further developed by
Brademeyer in an unpublished paper (1980).
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FIGURE C-I: ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROJECT AREA
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new crops, a new health clinic in the community of Aros, and
provision of some general education for both adults and
children.
Land Ownership Pattern
The community of Aros has 109 families, and the popula-
tion totals some 600 persons. In a survey of the area, the
population was divided into three different groups using
land ownership characteristics. There are 5 relatively rich
families who own between 45 to 50 hectares of land per
family. A second group, consisting of 34 families, is
characterized by the ownership of 2 to 10 hectares of land
per family. The third group, totaling some 70 families, is
characterized by being landless. They can be further sub-
divided into two groups. One group, numbering 50 families,
rents a total of about 100 hectares from the relatively
richer families for subsistence farming. They pay the
landlords with some of their agricultural produce and
occasionally with some services. The other 20 families are
directly under the "umbrella" of the relatively richer group
and do not farm any land of their own. They work for the
relatively richer families and in return receive some
subsistence wage, mostly in kind.
Agricultural Activities Before the Project
Presently the agricultural production consists mostly of
cassava, rice and maize, with a bit of livestock. The rela-
tively richer families and some of the small land owners
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have some agricultural surplus which they carry by pack
animals or even on their heads to the market town of Makir,
which is served by a good secondary road.
Table C-1 shows the quantity of land under the 3 crops,
the average yields and the market value of the present
agricultural production. Figure C-2 summarizes the present
distribution and type of agricultural activity.
Table C-1
PRESENT AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES
Yield/ Market
Crop Hectares Hectare Price Value
Cassava 250 2,000 lb. $ 0.25/lb. $125,000
Rice 80 3,250 lb. $ 0.50/lb. $130,000
Maize 75 2,020 lb. $ 0.70/lb. $106,050
Total 405 $361,050
Agricultural Activities Planned for the Project
It is planned to introduce new varieties of seeds and
the use of fertilizers for the crops of cassava, maize and
rice. The proper cultivation of the new varieties with the
essential assistance and direction of the proposed extension
staff will result in a substantial increase in yield.
175
GROUP 1
(families owning
between 50 to 60
hectares each)
GROUP 2
(families owning
between 2 to 10
hectares each)
140 ha
240 ha
(total)
100 ha
278 ha
(total)
40 ha
Rice
50 ha 5 ha
(cultivated) Cassava Type of
Cultivation
90 ha 5 ha
(left idle) Maize
(rented to
50 landless
families)
23 ha
(left idle)
255 ha
(cultivated)
70 ha
Cassava
25 ha
1a i ze
5 ha
Rice
35 ha
Rice
45 ha
Maize
<175 ha
Cassava
FIG•'PE C-2* SUMMARY OF PRESENT DISTRIBUTION AND TYPE OF AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY
There is at present a total of 113 hectares of culti-
vatible land which is presently uncultivated and idle. The
proposed plan is to induce the owners of this land to plant
cash crops of cocoa which is highly suitable to the local
climatic and soil conditions, highly profitable, and com-
mands a good price with high demand as an export commodity.
Adjacent to the community is a parcel of government land
which is covered with secondary forests, but which has
suitable soil for the cultivation of cocoa. It is planned to
clear this parcel to enable 70 landless families to culti-
vate one hectare each, with the necessary credit (payable in
easy installments) provided to them.
The Appraisal Report
The benefits accruing to the criteria under considera-
tion are discussed under the stipulation that the contribu-
tions are as a result of the provision of the feeder road.
Each of them will be elaborated in turn.
Economic Benefits Measure
The measure of the economic benefits is the difference
in the present value of the expected value of the agricul-
tural activity with implementation of the project with that
of the no-project alternative. The technique that will be
used to predict the agricultural activity is the assessment
of the project by an interdisciplinary appraisal team.
Table C-2 shows the results of the assessment of the
appraisal team of the probability that new cultivation will
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TABLE C-2
ASSESSMENT OF THE APPRAISAL TEAM ON THE
PROBABILITY OF NEW CULTIVATION
Type of Crop Rice Cocoa Cassava
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Maize
Group 1 2 3a 1 2 3a 3b 1 2 3a 1 2 3a
Year
00 0 0 0 0 00 00 0 0 0
1 0.8 0.6 0.5 .9 .6 .7 .4 1.0 .3 .2 1.0 .3 .2
2 0.9 0.6 0.5 .9 .6 .7 .4 1.0 .3 .2 1.0 .3 .3
3 0.9 0.7 0.5 1.0 .6 .8 .5 1.0 .4 .3 1.0 .4 .3
4 0.9 0.7 0.6 1.0 .8 .8 .5 1.0 .4 .3 1.0 .4 .4
5 1.0 0.8 0.6 1.0 .9 .9 .5 1.0 .5 .4 1.0 .5 .5
6 1.0 0.8 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 .6 1.0 .8 .5 1.0 .8 .7
7 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 .7 1.0 .9 .7 1.0 .9 .8
8 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 .8 1.0 1.0 .8 1.0 1.0 1.0
9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 .9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
10 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
11 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
12 1.0 1.0 1.0 ll.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
be carried out by the various groups for the four crops over
the project life. The expected average yields per hectare
for each of the crops are detailed in Table C-3. The
expected value of agricultural production with the implemen-
tation of the project is detailed in Table C-4. The figures
are obtained from calculations that are illustrated in
Tables C-5, C-6, C-7, and C-8 for each particular crop and
year. Table C-9 details the calculation of the expected
value of agricultural production without the project. The
measure that comes out from this analysis is the net
expected present value of agricultural activity:
Present value of Present value of
NEPV = agriculture production agriculture
with the project production without
the project
= $ 7,603,868 - $ 3,258,190*
= $ 4,345,678
Economic Costs Measure
Table C-10 shows a summary of the stream of expenditures
that make up the project costs. Briefly, the items of
expenditure include all items related to the construction
and maintenance of the road, the costs of building and
staffing the health clinic, the costs of the provision of
*These are discounted at 8 percent.
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Table C-3
EXPECTED AVERAGE YIELDS PER HECTARE
Year
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
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Cassava (ib)
2,000
2,200
2,400
2,600
2,800
3,000
3,300
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
Rice (lb)
3,250
3,500
4,000
5,000
5,500
5,750
5,750
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
Cocoa (Ib)
0
0
0
0
2,800
2,800
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
Maize (Ib)
2,020
2,200
2,400
2,600
2,600
2,600
2,800
3,000
3,200
3,200
3,200
3,200
3,200
Table C-4
EXPECTED VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION WITH THE PROJECT
Year Rice Cocoa Cassava Maize
0 130,000 0 125,000 106,050
1 136,938 0 128,575 109,011
2 152,313 0 132,150 112,966
3 185,125 0 139,400 118,433
4 201,438 559,468 144,200 119,448
5 218,750 559,468 155,125 122,290
6 218,750 669,030 183,500 137,991
7 229,000 689,040 204,313 150,983
8 234,500 720,795 213,500 168,000
9 240,000 761,250 218,750 168,000
10 240,000 769,950 218,750 168,000
11 240,000 778,650 218,750 168,000
12 240,000 787,350 218,750 168,000
Present value at 8 percent = $7,603,868
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TABLE C-6
ASSESSMENT OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
H4
c0
w
18
1ý
zC0ý4E-1
zO3U)
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Table C-9
EXPECTED VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
WITHOUT THE PROJECT
Year Rice Cassava Maize
0 130,000 125,000 106,050
1 130,000 125,000 106,050
2 130,000 125,000 106,050
3 130,000 125,000 106,050
4 130,000 125,000 106,050
5 143,000 125,000 106,050
6 143,000 125,000 106,050
7 143,000 125,000 106,050
8 143,000 125,000 106,050
9 156,000 125,000 121,958
10 156,000 125,000 121,958
11 156,000 125,000 121,958
12 156,000 125,000 121,958
Present value at 8 percent = $3,258,190
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Table C-10
STREAM OF PROJECT EXPENDITURES
Year Project Expenditures
0 170,000
1 310,000
2 300,000
3 350,000
4 100,000
5 90,000
6 60,000
7 60,000
8 60,000
9 50,000
10 40,000
11 20,000
12 20,000
Present value at 8 percent = $1,292,130
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general education and the costs related to the introduction
of better inputs for the agricultural activities (extension
workers, seeds, etc.).
Distribution Measure
In this particular project, the number of families
belonging to the target group of interest number some 104
families. In fact, all families in the project area except
for the five relatively richer families qualify for consid-
eration in this case. The projected area of cultivatable
land that will be under the ownership of these 104 families
totals 348 hectares. These include the 278 hectares owned by
families classified as group 2 and the 70 hectares of
government land (one hectare per family) that will be
provided to the 70 landless families (groups 3a and 3b).
Accessibility to Social Service Measure
At the present moment, the community of Aros enjoys the
health services of local midwives. As a consequence of the
implementation of the project, the people will have the
services of a health clinic which will be built in the
community. Thus the accessibility to health service will
have a measure of:
score of the change*
in health services x population served
= 10 x 600
= 6,000
*See Table 23
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In terms of accessibility to educational facilities, the
community will enjoy an initial change from nothing to some
general education which will be provided to the younger
population of the community. Thus the accessibility to
education services (from Table C-ll) will have a measure of:
score of the change in
educational facilities x population served
= 3 x 162
= 486
Finally, the measure of the accessibility to social
services is the sum of the two measures of accessibility to
health services and accessibility to educational facilities.
For this project this measure equals 6,000 + 486 = 6,486
ATSS units.
Employment Measure
The employment that is generated or is a consequence of
the implementation of the project arises from that of the
construction period of 30 months and the increased
agricultural activity over the project life. The employment
of the extension workers and other government employees will
not be counted because if they were not used in this project
they would presumably be employed elsewhere. Thus the
employment measure is primarily concerned with accounting
for the mobilization of the local factors of production, the
rural peasant labor.
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Table C-ll
ASSESSMENT OF THE UTILITY OF CHANGE
IN EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES
Subjective Assessment
of Educational ExpertsType of Change*
No change
E 1 to E 2
E 1 to E 3
E 1 to E 3
E 1 to E 2
E 2 to E 3
E 2 to E 3
+ E4
+E4
+E4
*The entire set of possible combination of changes has
not been detailed. The listing represents the likely
implemented changes.
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The project documents indicate a total of 83,050
man-days of employment is generated as a direct consequence
of the construction and maintenance activities.
For the cocoa cultivation, the agriculturalist indicated
that an average of 180 man-days per year of employment will
be generated per hectare of cocoa cultivation. From the
information generated by the appraisal team (Tables C-l,
C-2), it can be calculated that the expected total
annual-area of cocoa cultivation over the project life
amounts to 2,014.5 hectares. Correspondingly, the employment
generated by cocoa cultivation totals 362,610 man-days.
For the rice cultivation, the agriculturalist indicated
that the introduction of the new inputs and cultivation
methods will yield an increment of 55 man-days per year for
each hectare of transformed rice cultivation. The expected
total annual-area of transformed cultivation equals 855
hectares. Consequently, the employment generated by cocoa
cultivation totals 47,025 man-days.
For the cassava cultivation, the increment in employment
as a consequence of the changeover in agricultural technol-
ogy equals 39 man-days per year per hectare. The expected
total annual-area of transformed cultivation equals 2,083
hectares. Thus the employment generated from cassava
cultivation amounts to 81,237 man-days.
The increment in employment for the transformed maize
cultivation is 27 man-days per year per hectare. As 652
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hectares is the expected total annual-area of transformed
cultivation, the resulting employment generated is 17,604
man-days.
Finally, the total employment generated as a direct
consequence of the project is:
Construction-gene- Rice cultivation- Cocoa-cultivation-
rated employment + generated + generated
employment employment
+ Cassava cultivation + Maize cultivation
generated employment generated employment
= 83,050 + 47,025 + 362,610 + 81,237 + 17,604
= 591,526 man-days
C.2 A General Description of all Projects
In the previous section a detailed description of a
single project was presented. A total of 36 projects have
been identified and prepared; their appraisal measures are
presented in Table C-12. Each project has five measures and
each of these measures is denominated in its own units.
The economic benefits measure is represented by the
difference in the.expected present value of agricultural
activity with the project with the expected present value of
agricultural activity without the project. The economic
costs criteria is represented by the present value of all
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TABLE C-12 SUMMARY OF THE CRITERIA MEASURES FOR ALL THE PROJECTS
2 3943230 2864390 623 700105# 8324
3 2432100 2032000 326 200010 5324
4 9008000# 2324430 20* 356320 3234
5 8432432 1101368 35 253436 1634
6 7436562 1343520 39 275343 2398
7 5100000 1400362 421 623431 5002
8 4400320 968400 521 532432 4326
9 2960860 940500 631 361432 2498
10 1960000 932632 720 213432 5142
11 3943200 1010060 203 349946 3924
12 4900632 1326360 196 436248 3062
13 5100656 2010612 800 632160 11432
14 4562020 2306542 953 639196 12530
15 3862062 1743680 732 432960 8410
16 7632952 1560000 621 395432 6458
17 7800432 3400738 432 296050 4322
18 2860432 708680 205 543200 1900
19 1143620 693620 103 132000* 820
20 800632* 620632* 190 140000 0*
21 5432620 900632 25 290000 2320
22 3960462 1152120 1000# 360000 4324
23 6832420 3500000# 612 496000 7234
24 5823400 3010000 528 430000 13000#
25 3000620 1500060 700 180000 -2848
26 3400621 1200362 420 362620 3620
27 6236520 2003620 600 490000 6200
28 3900000 2400000 800 450000 8200
29 1500000 1200000 862 290000 4320
30 2190000 1500000 622 320000 7000
31 6620000 1600000 523 420000 7200
32 4702620 2010320 502 580000 8206
33 4230060 3206820 202 362000 9200
34 3630000 1100000 392 392000 1020
35 4000000 2163000 252 432000 7260
36 4526387 2456700 159 362140 6588
* Lowest
# Highest
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the relevant project expenditure items. The distribution
measure is captured by the ownership of land in hectares by
the target group of interest. The employment is represented
by the amount of employment in the construction and agri-
cultural activities generated by the project. Finally, the
accessibility to social services measure is represented by
the score in ATSS units resulting from the change in
accessibility to the services of health and education as a
consequence of the project.
There is a great variation in the contributions to the
five criteria for the 36 projects. No pattern can be used to
point out these differences as they depend on the specific
circumstances of.each particular project. As an extreme
example, any project may have the best contribution with
respect to one criterion, but at the same time may have the
worst contribution with respect to another criterion.
Project 4 has the characteristics just described. It has the
best contribution with respect to the economic benefits
measure ($9,008,000), but on the other hand, it has the
worst contribution with respect to the distribution criteria
(20 hectares). This is an example of a situation where the
land, in the project area of influence, is owned by rich
landlords who will be able to take advantage of the
transport improvement, resulting in high economic bene-
fits in the form of induced agricultural production but low
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distribution effects in the sense that the poorer farmers
will only reap an insignificant amount of the economic
be ne f its.
The other variations in the criteria among all the
projects can also be interpreted in an analogous fashion.
However, the interpretation will have to be made with
respect to the different contexts involved and the resulting
different implications.
C.3 Determination of the Individual Criterion Preference
Function
The various techniques that can be used to assess the
individual criterion preference (or utility) function have
been discussed in Chapter Two. The technique to be used
depends on the type of multicriteria problem encountered and
the preferences of the decision maker. Nevertheless, the
proper education and familiarization of the decision maker
with the technique used cannot be overemphasized.
In the present case, the direct method has been chosen
as the assessment technique. For each criteria, the lowest
to the highest attainment from all the projects under
consideration are put on the horizontal axis. Along the
vertical axis is a common scale of from 0 to 100. The lowest
attainment is assigned a value of 0, while the highest
attainment is assigned the value of 100. The exception is
the economic costs criteria, whereby the lowest attainment
is assigned a value of 0. The decision maker is asked to
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articulate an approximate value of the measure which
corresponds to 50 (mid-way) on the scale. This is repeated
for the two mid-points: one between 0 and 50 (25) and the
other between 50 and 100 (75).
The articulation of these three points by the decision
maker enables the analyst to arrive at approximate but
appropriate preference functions for each of the five
criteria. If more refined functions are required, more
points may be elicited in a similar manner. Often the
elicitation of just these approximate points will suffice
for a good representation of the preference function. The
preferences functions used in the case study are given in
Figures C-3 to C-7.
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ul(X)
100
75
50
25
0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0
ECONOMIC BENEFITS (millions $)
FIGURE C-3 : ECONOMIC BENEFITS PREFERENCE (UTILITY) FUNCTION
u(x) = 0.000009617 x - 7.699
0.000015 x - 40
800,632 < x < 6,000,000
6,000,000 < x < 9,008,000
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10.0
-0.000055 x + 134.135
u2(x) =  -0.0000227 x + 84.05
-0.0000227 x + 97.02
ECONOMIC COSTS (millions $)
FIGURE C-4. ECONOMIC COSTS PREFERENCE (UTILITY) FUNCTION
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u2(x)
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FIGURE C-5: DISTRIBUTION IRELFERENCE (UTII ITY) FUNCTION
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FIGURE C-6: EMPIOYMENT PREFERENCE (UTILITY) FUNCTION
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APPENDIX D. THE "RECOMMENDED" RANKING RULE
The "recommended" rankings produced in Chapter Four were produced
by a list-intersection, or Venn diagram, rule. Let us assume
the following:
a) Three decision-rule rankings have been produced (the
actual number is irrelevant, but more than three causes
diagramatic problems).
b) The rank of project j under the ith decision rule is
denoted R.
1l,]
c) {Vk} denotes the Venn intersection of the three rankings
considering only the top projects from each list, such
that projects in {Vk} appear in all but one (or 2, in
this case) of the partial lists. (VkJ is shown in
Figure D-l.
d) The best project has the lowest numerical rank, which
is one, and there are N projects.
The recommended or "compromise" ranking is then produced as
follows:
1. Determine {Vk}, K = 1, 2, ..... , N
2. Assign rank k to project j if the following are true:
j E {Vk}
j { {Vm ) for-all m < k
i.e., assign rank k to all projects entering the Venn
intersection of iteration k.
3. Rank the projects by the value of k, with lowest k
being ranked one.
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Figure D - 1
VENN INTERSECTION FOR "RECOMMENDED" RULE
WITH RULES OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE
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4. Break any ties between project rankings by the highest
total of each project's ranks on all but one (omit the
lowest ranking for each project) decision rule.
5. Break any remaining ties by the lowest rank achieved by
each project.
From Table 10 , omitting the mode-ordinal decision rule, we have
the project rankings given in Table D-1. The Vk are as given in
Table D-2.
Table D-1
TOP ELEVEN PROJECTS UNDER ORDINAL DECISION RULES
Rank
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Equal
Weights
14
13
22
16
15
24
8
2
28
31
27
Ordinal Preference
Rules
Max Min
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Table D-2
VENN INTERSECTIONS, {Vk}, AND ENTRANCES {Vk*}
14,
14,
14,
14,
14,
14,
5
5, 4, 22
5, 4, 22
5, 4, 22
5, 4, 22, 31, 6
5, 4, 22, 31, 6, 27
{Vk*
16
13
14,
22
31,
27
The rank under {Vk*} gives us the recommended ranking. The
ties of projects 14 and 5 are broken by the sum of their
top two rankings:
Project 14 = 1 + 6 = 7
Project 5 = 2 + 6 = 8
So Project 14 is ranked above Project 5. In a similar fashion,
Project 31 is ranked above Project 6.
The formal mathematical statement of the rule is as follows:
Let: Ri j denote the ith highest rank of the jth project,
considering all k decision rules.
Then: The projects are ranked according to their second-
lowest ranking:
RANK (Pj) = Rkl,j
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{Vk}
16
16, 13
16,
16,
16,
16,
16,
16,
13,
13,
13,
13,
13,
13,
If: RANK (Pq) = RANK (Pr) for some q, r
k-2
then: RANK (P q) > RANK (Pr) if i R.,q
i=l
k-2
< E R.
i=l 1,r
If the projects are still ranked equally after this operation,
their worst performances are taken into account:
RANK (P q) > RANK (Pr) if Rk,q < Rk, r
If the projects are still tied, they are practically identical
and may be ranked in either order.
For the "cardinal recommended" rule, or the case where one
ranking is considered to be of greater significance than the
others, the definition of {Vk becomes:
c) {Vk} denotes the Venn intersection of the rankings
considering only the top k projects from each list,
such that the projects in {V } are in the top k
projects in the dominant list. This V k is shown in
Figure D-2.
The first three steps of our rule are the same; the fourth
becomes:
4. Break any ties between project rankings by their
rank under the dominant decision rules.
The fifth step can never occur. Given our above notation, and
defining R* j to be the rank of the jth project under the domi-
nant decision rule, we may formalize this as follows:
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Figure D- 2
VENN INTERSECTION FOR "RECOMMENDED" RULE
WITH ONE RULE DOMINANT
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RANK (Pj) = R,,j if R,,j > RI j
RANK (Pj) = R2 j if R,,j = RIl jj 2*, j 1, j
if RANK (P )q = RANK (Pr) for some q,r
then
RANK (P q) > RANK (Pr) if R, < R,
qr,q *,p
Again, RANK denotes position in the list, with 1> 2, and R.
denotes numerical value of the rank position, with 1< 2.
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